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Defendants Easy Heat, Inc. ("Easy Heat") and Heron Cable Industries, Ltd. 
("Heron") (collectively "Defendants" or "Appellees") submit the following points and 
authorities in opposition to the appeal of Plaintiffs 438 Main Partnership, Triple Eagle, 
Inc., and Rainbow Trout, Inc. (collectively "Plaintiffs" or "Plaintiffs"). 
This appeal arises from three cases that were consolidated into one action. These 
cases all involved damage which resulted from a fire on historic Main Street in Park City, 
Utah, in June 1993. One of the three cases was settled before trial (95-09-00287PD), 
another was tried but is not on appeal (95-090-1841PD), and the third case involves the 
present Plaintiffs/Plaintiffs (94-090-8182PD). 
Plaintiff Szchewan Chinese Restaurant ("SCR") (95-090-1841 PD) has not filed a 
notice of appeal; hence, SCR's right to appeal the dismissal of its claims is barred. Its 
failure to appeal is also barred by its failure to timely seek a review at the trial court level 
through a motion for new trial. Rule 59(b), Utah R. Civ. P. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court nas jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Describing the issues on appeal and the applicable review standards is difficult in 
this case because the Plaintiffs have changed the issues, and hence attempted to modify 
the applicable standards of review, in mid-appeal. Plaintiffs' Docketing Statement 
describes the issues on appeal and standards of review as follows: 
a. Did the trial court err in denying Plaintiffs1 Rule 
59(a)(1) motion for new trial based upon irregularities in the 
trial proceedings? The standard of review is abuse of 
discretion. Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d at 425 (Utah 1999). 
b. Did the trial court err in denying Plaintiffs' Rule 
59(a)(6) motion for new trial based upon insufficiency of the 
evidence? 
A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a 
clearly erroneous standard. Alta Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst 846 P.2d 
at 1282 (Utah 1993). The standard of review for a trial 
court's denial of a motion for new trial is abuse of discretion. 
State v. Pena. 869 P.2d at 932 (Utah 1994). 
c. Did the trial court err in denying Plaintiffs1 Rule 
59(a)(7) motion for new trial on grounds of legal error 
including use of state-of-the-art evidence for a negligence 
related analysis? A trial court's conclusions of law in civil 
cases are reviewed for correctness. United Park City Mines 
Co. v. Greater Park City Co. 870 P.2d at 880 (Utah 1993). 
In contrast to those three issues, Plaintiffs1 Appeal Brief ("App. Brief1) now 
describes as the issues and standards: 
a. Were the findings and support of the order granting 
Defendants' motion for nonsuit and involuntary dismissal 
under Rule 41(b) sufficiently "complete, accurate and 
consistent" to "disclose the steps" the trial court followed to 
reach the "ultimate conclusion on each factual issue"? This 
issue is reviewed for correctness. Woodward v. Fasio, 823 
P.2d at 474-477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (other citations 
omitted). 
b. Did the trial court err in granting Defendants1 motion 
for nonsuit or dismissal under Rule 41(b) at the close of 
Plaintiffs' case on the grounds that Plaintiffs failed to 
establish a prima facie case? This issue is reviewed for 
correctness. Bair v. Axion Design LLC, 20 P.3d at 388. 
c. Were the findings against the clear weight of the 
evidence (offering a clearly erroneous standard under 
Woodward, 823 P.2d at 477)? 
d. In considering the motion for nonsuit on Plaintiffs' 
strict liability claim, did the trial court improperly rely on 
negligence principles? This issue is reviewed for correctness. 
State v. Pena, 859 P.2d at 932-938 (Utah 1994). 
e. Was the trial court summary judgment granting 
dismissal of the warnings claim reversible error? This issue 
is reviewed for correctness. (Id.) 
f. Did the trial court err in holding that Plaintiffs failed to 
establish that Melva Garcia owed a duty of care to insure the 
cable toggle switch was off? (No citation to standard of 
review.) (App. Brief at pp. 1-2.) 
Simply stated, Plaintiffs initially appealed from the decision of Judge Lewis 
denying their motion for new trial. They now attempt to appeal directly from the 
underlying case, i.e., Judge Thome's order granting a nonsuit in favor of Defendants. 
However, Plaintiffs are obligated to appeal from the denial of the post-trial motion rather 
than directly from the underlying case. See, e j^ , State v. Sixteen Thousand Dollars U.S. 
Currency, 914 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (proper course for aggrieved party 
is to file post-judgment motion, then appeal from denial of motion). "The decision to 
only consider appeals that arise from or include the denial of a post-judgment motion, 
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rather than from the . . . judgment directly, is a natural corollary of the general rule that 
[the appellate court] will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal." Id. at 
1178-79. This point is significant because the standard used by an appellate court to 
review the denial of a motion for new trial is — as was originally offered by Plaintiffs — 
an abuse of discretion standard. E.g., In re Justheim, 824 P.2d 432, 433 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991). "A trial court's grant or denial of a motion for new trial will not be overturned on 
appeal absent an abuse of discretion." Id. (citing Christensen v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 1375, 
1377 (Utah 1988) (same)). 
Plaintiffs' current description of issues on appeal and standards for review, which 
urge this Court to review Judge Thome's Rule 41(b) dismissal under a "correctness" 
standard, ignores that Judge Thome was sitting as the trier of fact. His ultimate 
conclusions that Plaintiffs failed to prove that the fire started at the subject cable, or that 
there was a design defect in the cable, are based on factual rulings. These factual 
findings are certainly not reviewed for correctness. Pena, 859 P.2d at 932-38. The 
appropriate standards of review, then, are as follows: 1) whether Judge Lewis improperly 
denied Plaintiffs' motion for new trial based upon the reasons set forth in the Appeal 
Brief is reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard, Child, 972 P.2d at 426;1 2) all of 
1
 Assuming that this appeal includes the claim that Plaintiffs should have received a 
new trial, Defendants note that the circumstances in which a trial court may grant a new 
trial are severely limited. No discretion exists to grant a new trial unless the moving 
party has shown entitlement based upon one of the few grounds enumerated in Rule 59. 
E.g., In re Justheim, 824 P.2d 433. Moreover, courts do not grant new trials unless it is 
proven that prejudicial error has tainted the proceedings or that substantial justice has not 
been done. Davis v. Grand County Service Area, 905 P.2d 888, 890 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). A motion based upon an alleged insufficiency of evidence to support the verdict 
i 
Judge Thome's factual finding are reviewed under a "clearly erroneous" standard, Alta 
Indus. Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P.2d 1282, 1285 (Utah 1993); 3) only the legal conclusions of 
Judge Thome, independent of his factual conclusions, are reviewed for correctness. 
Pena, 869 P.2d at 935. Judge Quinn's ruling on the motion for summary judgment was 
entered as a matter of law and is therefore reviewed for correctness. Id. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Three separate judges have heard Plaintiffs' arguments multiple times about why 
the remaining Defendants were responsible for the fire, and all three judges have 
consistently ruled against Plaintiffs' claims. In 1999, Judge Quinn dismissed Plaintiffs' 
claims that the cable was manufactured improperly or that the warnings that accompanied 
the cable could have proximately caused the fire since no one had bothered to read those 
warnings or provide them to the building occupant. In 2000, Judge Thome heard all of 
Plaintiffs' evidence and concluded not once, but twice, that Plaintiffs had failed to carry 
their burden of showing that the subject roof deicing cable was defective in design. He 
also concluded that Plaintiffs had failed to persuade him that the cable was at or near the 
origin or was the cause of the fire. In 2001, Judge Lewis reviewed the entire trial record 
in considering Plaintiffs' motion for new trial. She, too, concluded that there was 
sufficient evidence to sustain Judge Thome's findings and conclusions about both design 
defect and causation. 
will only be granted if the evidence supporting the verdict was "completely lacking" or 
uso slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable." Peats v. 
Commercial Sec. Bank, 746 P.2d 1191, 1193 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) cert, denied, 765 P.2d 
1277(1988). 
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Now, Plaintiffs want a fourth bite at the same apple, asking this Court to remand 
the case for an entirely new trial based on their recurring theme that these trial judges 
must not have understood their evidence. Plaintiffs' position is simply untenable for the 
reasons articulated below. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Judge Thorne found two independent and legally sufficient grounds to enter 
judgment against the Plaintiffs: First, Plaintiffs had failed to convince the court that the 
roof deicing cable was unreasonably dangerous in design; and, second, Plaintiffs failed to 
meet their burden of persuading the trial court that the design defect in the cable was the 
proximate cause of the fire. Judge Lewis upheld both grounds for nonsuit after reviewing 
the entire trial record. This Court should also sustain Judge Thome's judgment on both 
grounds for the following reasons, among others discussed below. 
First, Plaintiffs' claim that Judge Thome's findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law ("Findings and Conclusions") are legally insufficient has been waived. Plaintiffs 
failed to raise this issue before Judge Thorne in their written objections or at the hearing 
on these objections, and also failed to raise the issue before Judge Lewis on the motion 
for new trial. Moreover, the written Findings and Conclusions are legally sufficient as 
stated, and this Court may look to the oral record and other court documents to 
supplement these written findings. In short, the findings adequately demonstrate that 
both Judge Thome and Judge Lewis found Plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of 
persuasion. 
Second, Plaintiffs mistakenly assert that Judge Thome granted the motion for 
nonsuit on the basis that Plaintiffs had failed to prove a prima facie case. The record 
below clearly demonstrates, however, that Judge Thome found against Plaintiffs because 
they had failed to persuade him of their entitlement to relief. Rule 41(b), Utah R. Civ. P., 
permits a motion for nonsuit where a plaintiff has failed to state a prima facie case or has 
failed to persuade the trier of fact of the merits of its case. Plaintiffs have also confused 
the standard for granting a motion for directed verdict in a jury trial with the standard 
applicable to a motion for nonsuit in a bench trial, in which the judge is free to weigh the 
evidence and assess the credibility of witnesses. 
Third, Plaintiffs have provided a lengthy and irrelevant dissertation of their "prima 
facie case," while failing to meet their burden of marshaling the evidence. Having failed 
to marshal the evidence, Plaintiffs' appeal regarding the alleged insufficiency of the 
evidence should be summarily dismissed. Notwithstanding this critical error by 
Plaintiffs, Defendants have set forth some of the evidence which amply demonstrates 
why Judge Thome was entirely justified in dismissing Plaintiffs' claims. 
Fourth, the trial court did not rely upon inadmissible evidence in dismissing the 
strict liability design claim. In determining whether Plaintiffs had established that the 
cable was ''unreasonably dangerous" as defined by Utah law, Judge Thome considered 
the absence of a prior history of fires with this product, state-of-the-art in design of 
similar cables, testing and design standards promulgated by an independent, 
internationally recognized testing laboratory, National Electrical Code provisions relating 
to such cables as adopted in Utah, among other things, in deciding what an ordinary 
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consumer could have expected under the circumstances of this installation, including 
abuse of the product. Judge Thome followed the majority rule by not finding any of this 
particular evidence dispositive; rather, he ruled on the totality of the evidence presented 
to him. Additionally, Judge Thome found the Plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden 
under Utah law of demonstrating an economically feasible alternative design. The 
evidence on this point was not in dispute and is fatal to Plaintiffs' strict liability design 
claim independent of any other evidence. 
Finally, the warnings claim is moot by reason of Judge Thome's findings on 
causation. Furthermore, Judge Quinn properly dismissed Plaintiffs' strict liability 
warnings claim as Plaintiffs failed to adduce any competent evidence that the warnings 
about which they complained were ever read by anyone. Plaintiffs could not possibly 
prove any causal link between alleged deficiencies in the warnings and the subject fire. 
ARGUMENT 
1. JUDGE THORNE'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ARE MORE THAN LEGALLY SUFFICIENT TO EXPLAIN THE BASIS 
FOR NONSUIT. 
A. The Alleged Failure of the Court to Disclose Its "Steps" in Reaching 
Findings Was Waived By Plaintiffs9 Failure to Raise the Argument in 
Objections to the Findings or in the Motion For New Trial. 
Utah law is clear that prior to asking an appellate court to reverse a trial court, the 
Appellant must have first brought the alleged error to the attention of the trial court and 
then been denied relief. See, e.g., Brookside Mobile Home Park v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, 
T| 14, 48 P.3d 968. "[I]n order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be presented 
to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." 
7 
14; accord Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998) (same). 
Plaintiffs did file an objection to the Findings and Conclusions. However, none of those 
objections articulated the argument Plaintiffs now make; to wit, that the findings did not 
disclose the "steps" the Judge took to reach his conclusions.2 (R. 6468-6484.) 
Plaintiffs also failed to raise this argument in their motion for new trial. (R. 6735-
6752.) Likewise, they did not identify the transcript from the hearing on their motion for 
new trial as a record on appeal, as there is no reference there to this theory. 
Simply stated, Plaintiffs1 latest theory is being presented for the first time on 
appeal. Neither Judge Thorne nor Judge Lewis was ever asked by Plaintiffs to correct 
this alleged problem, i.e., to more clearly articulate the "steps taken" to reach the 
findings; therefore, Plaintiffs have waived their right to review of this issue on appeal. 
14 
B. Plaintiffs1 Authorities Are Inapposite and Incomplete. 
Plaintiffs' next misstep is their unqualified reliance on Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 
996 (Utah 1987) in which this Court suggested that failure of a trial court to make 
findings on all material issues is reversible error unless the uncontroverted facts support 
the missing finding. Id. at 999 (citation omitted); App. Brief at 27. 
Plaintiffs claim this issue was preserved below by a stipulation that the hearing on 
its objections to the Findings should be included in the trial record. However, that 
hearing did not take up the court's alleged failure to adequately disclose its steps as it was 
not raised in the objection. Indeed, at the hearing, Plaintiffs were asked by the court if 
there were other concerns not addressed, to which Plaintiffs simply said no. June 29, 
2000 Hearing Transcript, added to record by stipulation, at p. 7. 
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Unfortunately, Plaintiffs have overlooked this Court's subsequent opinion in State 
v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991) where this Court clarified Acton by holding that 
even the complete absence of a finding on a material issue is not fatal error. Id. at 788, 
n.6 (citations omitted) (e.g., remand may be avoided by presumption that the trial court 
would find facts necessary to support the judgment, that an unnecessary or missing 
factual finding was implicit from other findings, or where there is competent evidence to 
support judgment). This is in accord with the law of other jurisdictions. 9 James Wm. 
Moore, et al., Moore's Federal Practice |^ 52.12[2] (3d Ed. 1999) and cases cited therein. 
Plaintiffs have also failed to identify what evidence in the record an appellate 
court may look to in assessing the sufficiency of the trial court's findings. A trial court 
may state its findings orally, Martindale v. Adams, 777 P.2d 514, 517 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989), and a reviewing court is not confined to written findings. Erwin v. Erwin, 773 
P.2d 847, 849 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Merriam v. Merriam, 799 P.2d 1172, 1177 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). The findings may be found in other court documents, including memoranda. 
Id 
Finally, Plaintiffs mistakenly claim that insufficient findings must necessarily 
result in a new trial since Judge Thorne now sits on the appellate court. (App. Brief at 
28.) Plaintiffs cite for this proposition a case in which the judge was no longer available 
due to retirement. Acton, 737 P.2d at, 999. That case, however, does not explain why 
Judge Thorne, who still sits as a judge in a court of record in Utah, may not supplement 
his findings and conclusions, if even necessary. Utah's Rules of Judicial Administration 
suggest, to the contrary, that Judge Thorne may be appointed for that purpose, if needed. 
Rule 3-108(3)(B), Ut. R. J. Admin. Additionally, Plaintiffs overlook the fact that Judge 
Lewis reviewed the entire record of this case, including the entire trial transcript, before 
ruling on Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial. (R. 7647-7648, 7658.) Accordingly, 
Plaintiffs' remedy would not be a new trial but, rather, a remand to Judge Thorne or 
Judge Lewis for supplementation of the findings as needed. 
Ck Judge Thome's Findings of Fact Are Plainly Sufficient Both as Written 
and as Supplemented Elsewhere in the Record. 
1. Design Defect. 
Plaintiffs' argument on the alleged insufficiency of the findings of fact reflects a 
fundamental oversight in their argument as a whole. Judge Thorne ruled on two 
independent and legally sufficient grounds that Plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden 
of proof. Plaintiffs' argument regarding the insufficiency of the findings, however, does 
not address the findings as they relate to their design allegations, focusing instead on 
causation issues. What Plaintiffs failed at trial to realize, and what they evidently fail to 
apprehend still on appeal, is their burden to first demonstrate that the product was 
defective in design. 
The trial court's findings on the issue of design defect are clearly adequate. The 
court's preamble to the Findings notes specifically that Plaintiffs had "failed to prove by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the product was unreasonably dangerous . . . . " (R. 
6667 at 3.) The written Findings themselves then describe in detail some of the evidence 
the court considered in concluding that Plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of 
proving that the product was unreasonably dangerous, including listing standards, 
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reference to state-of-the-art, absence of any other similar fire or accident, inapplicability 
of evidence of fires related to other models or designs of roof cable, and failure to prove 
that alternative designs were economically feasible. (R. 6670-6671.) The court further 
found that an ordinary and prudent buyer would not find the product unreasonably 
dangerous in the absence of these design alternatives. Id. 
The Findings specifically incorporate the findings and conclusions expressed at 
the hearings of this matter. (R. 6667 at 3.) At those hearings, Judge Thorne expressed 
orally the basis for his conclusion that Plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of 
persuading him that an ordinary consumer would find the product unreasonably 
dangerous in design, including common knowledge about risks ordinarily associated with 
electrical products, particularly when they are abused. (R. 7377 at pp. 1949-1950; 
R. 7397-7398 at pp. 1976-1977.) Judge Thorne noted, for example, that an ordinary 
consumer could not reasonably expect a product to be failsafe which, in essence, is what 
Plaintiffs demanded of a product intended solely for use on rooftops in the winter to 
prevent ice dams but which, instead, was attached to the side of a building and energized 
during summer months. (R. 7397 at p. 1976.) 
2. Causation. 
Plaintiffs' argument on causation is equally unavailing. Plaintiffs again 
misunderstand the basis for Judge Thome's ruling. Judge Thorne found that the ADKS 
roof deicing cable was not the proximate cause of the subject fire. (R. 6671.) This 
finding reflects the court's decision that Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to establish 
the origin and cause of the fire at the ADKS cable. Judge Thorne specifically noted 
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earlier in the Findings that the "[PJlaintiffs had failed to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the origin of the fire was at or near the subject roof deicing cable or that the 
cable caused the fire." (R. 6667 at 3.) This conclusion is supplemented further in the 
hearing record where Judge Thome conceded that while Plaintiffs' evidence established a 
"possibility" that the fire started where and how they alleged, Plaintiffs' evidence did not 
convince him more probably than not that the roof deicing cable started the fire. (R. 
7397-7398 at pp. 1976-1977.) 
Plaintiffs have misapplied the cases they rely upon to conclude that the Findings 
are an insufficient statement of the reasons for Judge Thome's conclusions. Those cases 
deal with affirmative findings by a court establishing the proof of a disputed matter. E.g., 
Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474 (granting petition to terminate parental rights) and 
Williamson v. Williamson, 1999 UT App. 219, 983 P.2d 1103 (granting judgment 
terminating alimony). Here, Judge Thome found that Plaintiffs had not proven their case. 
He did not specifically find an alternate cause of the fire, as Plaintiffs evidently expected 
him to do, but which he clearly was not required to do. A "negative" ruling (i.e., 
Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to convince him of their case) obviously requires 
less explanation than an affirmative ruling about where and how the fire started. Nor did 
such a conclusion require the court to explain why he did not find Plaintiffs' witnesses 
credible. It is well-established in Utah that findings of ultimate fact implicitly reflect 
credibility or lack thereof. McKinstrav v. McKinstrav, 628 P.2d 1286, 1289 (Utah 1981). 
Judge Thorne even referred specifically to some of the testimony he reviewed 
between initially denying the motion on this ground and then granting it, which included 
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the conflicting opinions of Dr. Babrauskas, Plaintiffs' expert, and Dr. Ogle, Defendants' 
expert. (R. 7397-7398 at pp. 1976-1977.) These two experts offered conflicting opinions 
about whether the ADKS cable, even in a fault scenario, was a competent source of 
ignition of the wood fascia board to which it was allegedly attached. It is clear from 
Judge Thome's specific reference to this testimony that Dr. Babrauskas did not convince 
him, especially in light of Dr. Ogle's contradictory testimony, that this cable was even 
capable of sustaining ignition of an exterior wood fascia board. 
Judge Thome also specifically noted that Plaintiffs' cause-and-origin experts had 
failed to convince him about the origin of the fire in the southeast comer. (R. 7397-7398 
at pp. 1976-1977.) Judge Thome was not required to and did not enter a specific finding 
that the fire did not originate in the southeast comer of the 438 building; instead, he 
found that Plaintiffs had failed to convince him that it had started there or that a defect in 
the cable caused the fire. Accordingly, Judge Thome appropriately entered a finding that 
the ADKS cable was not the proximate cause of the fire. Judge Thome was not required 
to explain why he found Plaintiffs' cause-and-origin testimony incredible, when such a 
finding is implicit in his statement that Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
Judge Lewis then reviewed the entire trial transcript before ruling on Plaintiffs' 
motion for new trial. Judge Lewis not only found substantial evidence to support Judge 
Thome's decisions, she also outlined some of the evidence that persuaded her of 
Plaintiffs' failure to meet their burden to show the origin and cause of the fire. (R. 7647-
7648,7651-7653.) 
Finally, the evidence set forth by Defendants below is competent and substantial 
enough to explain why Judge Thorne ruled against Plaintiffs on causation as well as 
design defect. See III. infra at pp. 18-34. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT GRANT THE MOTION FOR NONSUIT 
BECAUSE OF PLAINTIFFS9 FAILURE TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE 
CASE. 
Plaintiffs mistakenly assert throughout their arguments that the court granted the 
motion for nonsuit because Plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie case. See, e.g., 
App. Brief at 27-29. However, Plaintiffs have provided no citation to the record where 
the court ruled merely on the basis of Plaintiffs' failure to prove a prima facie case. The 
phrase "prima facie" does not appear in the written findings and was not uttered by Judge 
Thorne in his oral findings. To the contrary, the record demonstrates that the trial judge 
simply was not persuaded by the evidence presented by the claimants. (See, e.g., 
R. 7397-7398 at pp. 1976-1977.) 
In furtherance of this misguided theory. Plaintiffs attempt to equate Judge 
Thome's ruling on Defendants' motion for nonsuit with a ruling on a motion for directed 
verdict. App. Brief at 29. While it is certainly true that a Rule 41 (b) motion for nonsuit 
is the "procedural" equivalent in a bench trial to a motion for directed verdict in a jury 
trial, see, e ^ ? Bair v. Axiom Design, LLC, 2001 UT 20, \ 10, 20 P.3d 388, it does not 
follow that the substantive requirements for these distinct motions are the same. In fact, 
they are quite different. A defendant moving for a directed verdict must demonstrate that 
no evidence exists that raises a question of material fact and the court considering the 
motion may not base its decision on credibility or the weight of the evidence. E.g., 
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Grossen v. DeWitt 1999 UT App. 167, % 7, 982 P.2d 581 (citations omitted). In contrast, 
in a bench trial, the trial court, as the finder of fact, is free to weigh evidence, consider 
credibility and dismiss the plaintiffs' case even if the plaintiff has established a prima 
facie case that the court finds unpersuasive. Id. at 584. Defendants cited these 
propositions to Judge Thorne at the second hearing. (R. 7397 at pp. 1970-1971.) 
Finally, Plaintiffs apparently take exception to Judge Thome's consideration of 
Defendants' evidence in deciding the issue of causation.3 App. Brief at 31-33. This 
assertion is unpersuasive for numerous reasons. Plaintiffs have not preserved this as an 
issue for appeal. They did not raise any objection to Defendants' counsel's or Judge 
Thome's reference to such evidence in support of the motion for nonsuit, including Judge 
Thome's reference to his review of Dr. Ogle's testimony before deciding the issue. (R. 
7397-7398 at pp. 1971-1972, 1976-1977.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs failed to raise this 
issue in their motion for a new trial, thereby waiving it on appeal. Brookside, 43 P.3d at 
972. 
Plaintiffs also waived this issue by consenting to the introduction of Defendants' 
evidence before they rested. Plaintiffs were not prepared to rest as scheduled and 
consented on the record to the introduction of Defendants' evidence prior to the 
Plaintiffs compound this error by suggesting that Judge Thome did not consider 
circumstantial evidence as proof of causation or defect. App. Brief at 24-25. Indeed, 
Plaintiffs go so far as to suggest that Judge Thome did not consider any of their evidence 
in ruling on the motion. App. Brief at 25. Plaintiffs can provide no citation in the record 
to support these unfounded allegations, and they are contrary to the record where Judge 
Thome describes considering not only the evidence he heard at trial, but Plaintiffs1 
written proffers as well (R. 7397-7398 at pp. 1976-1977). 
conclusion of their own case. (R. 7288 at pp. 1377-1378.) It is disingenuous, therefore, 
for Plaintiffs to object to consideration of defense evidence under these circumstances. 
Plaintiffs also stipulated to a number of the facts that were in evidence at the time 
of Judge Thome's ruling (see R. 6310-6331), many of which damaged Plaintiffs' case. 
For example, Plaintiffs stipulated the subject cable had met all listing standards 
continuously for a number of years, and there had been no fires reported in connection 
with the cable. (See R. 6311 -6313.) They further stipulated to facts concerning the cost 
of the product that made their own experts' testimony about the cost of the proposed 
design alternative prohibitive. (See R. 6313.) 
Plaintiffs attempt to avoid clear Utah law that allows consideration of defense 
evidence is unpersuasive. Rule 41(b) specifically permits, but does not require, a trial 
court to wait until the close of evidence to rule on the motion. In Deseret Livestock v. 
Utah Power & Light Co., 541 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1975), this Court clearly held that a Rule 
41(b) motion may include consideration of a defendant's evidence. IdL at 1113. 
Although Plaintiffs characterize this as an anomalous decision that does not cite case law 
in support of its conclusion, this result follows from the plain language of Rule 41(b), and 
this Court's interpretation of Utah's rules of civil procedure is authority enough.4 Just as 
the trial court "need not wait until a defendant's essentially superfluous case has been 
4
 Plaintiffs' objection that the court in Deseret Livestock failed to explain how a 
defendant's evidence could possibly be relevant to the question of whether a plaintiff has 
established & prima facie case is answered by the fact that the motion for nonsuit is not 
limited to the issue of a prima facie case but can be decided on the basis that the trial 
judge simply is not persuaded by plaintiffs' case. Bair, 2001 UT 20 at [^12 (citation 
omitted). 
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presented to end the trial," Grosser 1999 UT App. 167 at ^ 9, so too may a trial court 
end the trial at any point following submission of the motion and need not await the end 
of trial. Rule 41(b), Utah. R. Civ. P.; see also Sanders v. General. Serv. Admin., 707 
F.2d 969 (7th Cir. 1983) (granting rule 41(b) motion after initial denial and after 
presentation of three defense witnesses); Nulf v. Int'l Paper Co., 656 F.2d 553 (10th Cir. 
1981) (granting rule 41(b) motion after hearing limited testimony from first defense 
witness). 
III. SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTED NONSUIT. 
Plaintiffs claim that Judge Thome's Findings go against the clear weight of the 
evidence. This argument suffers from three fatal flaws. First, Plaintiffs have failed to 
marshal the evidence to substantiate this claim.5 Second, Plaintiffs ignore the fact that it 
was their burden to prove causation, not Defendants' burden to disprove it, nor the trial 
court's burden to establish proof of this negative. Third, the evidence in favor of nonsuit 
was substantial. 
A. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Marshal Evidence in Support of The Trial 
Court's Ruling. 
Plaintiffs' appeal should be summarily denied because the Plaintiffs have not even 
remotely marshaled evidence to support the trial court's findings as required to mount 
such an appeal. Plaintiffs' appeal is predicated largely on counsel's self-serving 
5
 Plaintiffs claim it would be futile to marshal the evidence because the decision 
was so clearly erroneous and the Findings were deficient. The fact that Judge Lewis 
agreed with Judge Thorne after reviewing the transcript and/or videotape of the trial, 
should, among other things, be an indication that this is not the case, and the marshaling 
requirements should have been observed. 
characterization of the evidence, devoid of critical points made on cross-examination 
with witnesses and through adverse experts. Though Plaintiffs mention some points 
made by Defendants' witnesses, they are couched in self-serving language, editorializing 
- rather than garnering - the evidence. 
The standard required of an appellant challenging the sufficiency of evidence is 
significant. In order to successfully attack factual findings, "an Appellant must marshal 
the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, 
the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the 
evidence,' thus making them clearly erroneous."' In re estate of Bartell 776 P.2d 885, 
886 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). In 
determining whether the trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous, '"due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses.'" Bailey v. Call 767 P.2d 138, 139 (Utah Ct. App), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 
(Utah 1989) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a)); see also Matthews v. Galetka, 958 P.2d 949, 
951 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, Matthews v. Warden, 982 P.2d 88 (1998) ("It is the 
prerogative of the trial court to judge the credibility of the evidence. . . . [The court] is not 
compelled to believe evidence where there is anything about it which would reasonably 
justify refusal to accept it as the facts, and this includes the self-interest of the witness." 
(citation omitted)). "If the Appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court 
assumes that the record supports the findings of the trial court." Saunders v. Sharp, 806 
P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991). 
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B. The Evidence Justifying Nonsuit on Causation was Substantial, 
Plaintiffs go to great lengths to marshal their evidence, but devote little effort to 
marshaling Defendants' evidence or explaining why it could not have justified the result 
below. Accordingly, Defendants set forth below some of the evidence which supported 
the trial court's decision on the causation issue.6 
1. Plaintiffs' Witnesses 
Judge Thorne had the benefit of listening to and/or reading the testimony of each 
of Plaintiffs' witnesses. It was clear from that testimony, including the cross-
examinations of those witnesses, that Plaintiffs' experts offered unsubstantiated, 
inconsistent and often contradictory theories of the origin of the fire and an improbable 
explanation as to its cause. The work of these so-called experts was fraught with 
numerous problems, including marginal competence in some cases, lack of thoroughness 
and consistency, lack of objectivity, failure to record and preserve critical evidence and 
other facts that greatly undermined the conclusions these witnesses reached. 
Defendants' argument on the weight of evidence focuses on the causation issue 
(i.e., origin and cause) to the exclusion of Plaintiffs' design defect claims. See App. Brief 
at 34. Accordingly, this section of the memorandum will marshal evidence relating to 
that issue alone. The record below is replete with evidence disputing the Plaintiffs' 
design defect claims. This evidence includes many stipulated facts. It also includes the 
direct testimony of Dr. Becherer addressing each of Plaintiffs' alleged design flaws. (See, 
e.g., R. 3712 at pp. 1569-1570 (GFCI intended to protect against personnel shock, not 
fire. GFCI not industry standard in this type of product); R. 7312 at p. 1567 (no fire 
history associated with ADKS cable significant because if there was a problem with 
series-resistance design manufacturer would have abundant problem history); R. 7317 at 
pp. 1604-1609 (aluminum perfectly acceptable and commonly used conductor).) 
1Q 
a. Sam Coleman. 
Mr. Coleman assumed his job in 1983 with no prior education, training or 
experience relevant to the science of origin and cause of fires. (See R. 7074 at pp. 173-
174.) He had marginal qualifications and experience in conducting major fire 
investigations at the time of this fire. Mr. Coleman's investigation was plagued by his 
reliance upon unrecorded and unsubstantiated eyewitness accounts (R. 7075 at pp. 178-
179) that created a preconceived bias (i.e., he assumed the fire started where first seen on 
exterior and focused his investigation there). (See, e.g., R. 7076 at pp. 186-187.) He 
passed along his biases to other investigators at the inception of their "investigations," 
including Park City Fire Marshal Ron Ivie and Plaintiffs' expert John Blundell. (R. 7077 
at pp. 197-198; R. 7081 at pp. 225-226.) Mr. Coleman could not decide where the fire 
truly originated. He could only suggest that it started in a cubicle-type area at the 
southeast corner. (Id.) In other words, his area of origin included the roof itself, portions 
of the building to which the roof deicing cable was not even attached, as well as the 
building interior in that zone. (Id.) This testimony was contrary to Plaintiffs' theory that 
the fire originated on the exterior of the building about 9 inches below the roof line at a 
point 32 inches on the cable from the cold junction (where the heating element of the 
7
 h i ; see also R. 7075 at pp. 175-176 (conceded that when deposed subsequent to 
this fire investigation he was unfamiliar with what NFPA 921 (Guide for Fire and 
Explosion Investigations) even was). 
8
 See, e ^ , R. 7078-7079 at pp. 201-204 and 206-208 (originally had no opinion as 
to origin when deposed; later decided it could have been "a horizontal area encompassing 
the roof... and below it. On the eave area and the fascia . . . [a]nd . . . the vertical area 
encompass[ing] the area down to where the device was plugged in."). 
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cable was joined to the power supply cord). See App. Brief at 40, n.9. He admitted to a 
number of other errors as well.9 Mr. Coleman could not explain why there was not more 
damage at the southeast corner. (R. 7084 at pp. 250-252.) He could not even recall if he 
inspected the heat cable. (R. 7078 at pp. 206-208.) Mr. Coleman at least agreed that 
another competent fire investigator might disagree with his conclusions. (R. 7081 at p. 
227.) 
b. John Blundell 
John Blundell conducted a cursory examination of the actual area of alleged 
origin, focusing instead on his client's adjacent building, 438 Main. (R. 7163-7164 at 
pp. 703-707.) Mr. Blundell's deposition and trial testimony conflicted about whether this 
fire started on the inside or outside of the 436 Main building (a very significant fact since 
the cable was attached to the outside rather than to the inside of the building).10 
c. Ron Ivie 
Plaintiffs proffered the testimony of Ron Ivie, the Park City building inspector 
who doubles as its fire marshal. Chief among the problems with Mr. Ivie's testimony is 
that he simply relied upon Mr. Coleman's conclusions, which as shown above, were 
faulty to begin with. Mr. Coleman testified that Mr. Ivie did not arrive at the fire scene 
9
 E.g., Mistaken about fire sprinklers (R. 7080 at pp. 218-219); testified to 
nonexistent antifreeze loop (id. at p. 220) and false ceiling that was not there (R. 7083-
7084 at pp. 246-247). 
1
 See, R. 7183 at pp. 758-759 (at first testifying fire started on exterior fascia board, then 
admitting his analysis determined the fire started on the interior side of the fascia board when 
confronted with his deposition testimony). See also R. 7186 at p. 776 (admitting his trial 
testimony changed from his deposition testimony about whether fire sprinkler system was 
working to suppress fire). 
until several hours after Mr. Coleman had arrived. (R. 7077 at p. 198.) As soon as Mr. 
Ivie arrived, Mr. Coleman shared his conclusions with Mr. Ivie. (Id.) Hence, Mr. Ivie 
began his "investigation" with the faulty premise of Mr. Coleman, i.e., that the fire started 
at the southeast corner where the cable was attached. His investigation amounted to no 
more than gathering a few artifacts from and taking a few pictures of the locations Mr. 
Coleman directed him to. 
Mr. Ivie also claims to be the only witness to have seen a clip or staple affixed to 
the building at the alleged point of origin (see R. 6202), which is inconsistent with other 
experts' theories that the point of origin was destroyed in the fire. He either did not take 
the clip into evidence or later lost it as it has never been produced. Although he claims to 
have taken a photograph of this clip (see id.), he was never able to produce that 
photograph. 
d. Jake Jacobsen 
Mr. Jacobsen was hired by the Plaintiffs because they preferred his opinions to 
their original expert, Mr. Blundell. (R. 7151 at pp. 600-601.) In his written report, 
prepared shortly after his fire scene investigation, Mr. Jacobsen opined that the fire 
started "at" the roofline. (R.7118 at p. 426.) At his deposition, however, he testified that 
the fire started at a trim or border board below the roofline. (Id.) Also at his deposition, 
he drew a diagram of the fire origin that included areas both above the roofline and below 
the trim board. (R. 7119 at pp. 430-431.) By the time of trial, Mr. Jacobsen decided the 
fire had started in the southeast corner "of the storage room, but then said that meant it 
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was on the outside, not the inside. (R. 7118 at p. 424.) He later said that the fire started 
on the exterior just below the roofline. (Id.) 
Naturally, Mr. Jacobsen did not save the charred remnants of boards at his alleged 
point of origin. (R. 7119 at p. 428.) Thus, another investigator would not be able to look 
at the evidence he allegedly examined to verify the accuracy of his conclusions. (Id. at p. 
431.) Indeed, Mr. Jacobsen agreed that his report would not allow another investigator to 
determine what other areas of origin or causes he considered and ruled out or why. (R. 
7151 at pp. 605-606.) 
Mr. Jacobsen allegedly interviewed the first eyewitness to the fire, Bill Ferris, who 
never surfaced during discovery. Although he tape-recorded interviews of the building 
occupants at a later point, he never bothered to obtain a statement from or tape record an 
interview of Mr. Ferris, and had only cursory notes of his discussion with Mr. Ferris. (R. 
7155 at pp. 632-633.) He never spoke to Lt. Ryan, the first police officer to arrive at the 
scene prior to arrival of the fire department. (R. 7120 at p. 438.) He also failed to 
interview the firefighters and did not even bother to review their deposition testimony. 
(R. 7121 at pp. 446-447.) 
Mr. Jacobsen offered an unsubstantiated theory about why the alleged point of 
origin, the southeast corner, suffered comparably little damage in the fire. He claimed it 
was a result of initial suppression efforts together with reintroduction of the fire to that 
area. Unfortunately, his written report did not refer to this critical reintroduction of fire 
theory. (R. 7153 at p. 619.) More importantly, his explanations about initial suppression 
efforts were inaccurate and incredible. He explained how the first eyewitness, Mr. Ferris, 
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used five-gallon buckets to extinguish the exterior fire 10-15 feet above him without a 
ladder, which absolutely defied common sense. (R. 7153 at pp. 623-625.) He then 
explained that immediate suppression efforts by the fire department, shooting water on 
the rear exterior corner of the building prevented more damage in that area. (R. 7149 at 
p. 584.) He testified to this despite having never interviewed the firefighting crew. 
During trial, however, Captain Burns, who was in charge of the first arriving unit, 
testified to precisely the opposite of Mr. Jacobsen's understanding. (See, e.g.. R. 7070 at 
p. 135) (fire not visible at exterior of the building until about one-half hour after arrival; 
no water was sprayed on exterior rear corner of building upon arrival).11 In short, he was 
a patently incredible witness. 
e. Plaintiffs' Engineers 
Plaintiffs offered testimony from three engineers: Mr. Foley, Mr. Kilgore and Dr. 
Babrauskas. Mr. Foley and Dr. Babrauskas were offered solely by written proffer. Mr. 
Kilgore's testimony was offered by way of a written proffer supplemented orally by 
Plaintiffs' counsel. 
None of these witnesses were available for live cross-examination, nor had 
Defendants submitted their written proffers, before nonsuit was granted. However, 
11
 Similarly, Jacobsen admitted to being mistaken about other aspects of the fire 
scene. E.g.. R. 7149 at pp. 587-90 (admitting to being mistaken about the design and 
layout of the fire suppression sprinkler system); R. 7150 at pp. 594-96 (first testifying 
that the 436 building did not have false ceilings [in which the fire could hide] then 
confessing he indicated several such false ceilings during his deposition). He also 
provided inconsistent testimony about the nature of the initial attack (i.e.. whether it was 
an interior or roof attack). R. 7153 at pp. 619-620. 
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Defendants' experts had testified and effectively rebutted the origin and cause opinions of 
each of these witnesses. That testimony is reviewed below. 
2. Defendants' Experts 
Defendants offered the expert testimony of Robert Russell, Dr. Russell Ogle and 
Dr. Robert Becherer on the issues of origin and cause. 
a. Mr. Russell 
Mr. Russell is a veteran investigator of fire cause and origin, having investigated 
some 1,200 fires prior to this case. (R. 7292 at p. 1403.) He has been employed by 
Packer Engineering since 1981, and has background education in electronic circuits and 
engineering, among other fields. He spent four and a half years in the United States Navy 
employed as an aviation electronics specialist. (R. 7291 at p. 1399.) He is a member of 
the National Fire Prevention Association ("NFPA"). Mr. Russell examined cable 
artifacts with Plaintiffs1 expert Michael Foley, and also traveled to Salt Lake City to 
examine the artifacts held by Plaintiffs1 expert Jake Jacobsen. (R. 7292-7293 at pp. 1410-
1411.) Mr. Russellfs ability to pinpoint an area of origin was limited by the fact that the 
Plaintiffs destroyed the fire scene prior to contacting Defendants, and moreover, 
Plaintiffs* own documentation of the scene was limited. (E.g., R. 7293 at pp. 1414-16.) 
Nevertheless, based upon the photographic record, his review of the depositions of the 
fire fighters, video tape of the fire, as well as his own inspection of artifacts, Mr. Russell 
concluded that the fire did not originate at the exterior southeast corner of the 436 Main 
building (where the cable allegedly was attached) (R. 7294 at p. 1420 and 1423-1425) nor 
even at the interior of the southeast corner of 436 Main. (Id. at 1421.) Among other 
things, Mr. Russell testified in support of this opinion to the following: 
There was an abundant amount of available, unconsumed fuel at Plaintiffs' alleged 
point of origin. (R. 7294 at pp 1421 and 1423-1425.) Through the use of photographic 
evidence, he showed the court where there was still an ample supply of combustible fuel 
which had not burned at that location, including a significant artifact directly above the 
point of origin that should not have been there if the Plaintiffs were correct (R. 7294-
7295 at pp. 1426-1427), as well as rafters that should have been consumed or more badly 
damaged (R. 1795 at p. 1428). Shingles in the vicinity of Plaintiffs' alleged point of 
origin also did not show damage consistent with their theory. (R. 7298 at p. 1453.) 
Mr. Russell reviewed photographs showing a direction of travel consistent with 
the fire moving toward the southeast corner from the inside rather than originating at that 
corner and moving inside. (E.g., R. 1795-1796 at pp. 1433-1438.) The char pattern 
shows that the fire originated on the inside not outside of these boards. (R. 7297 at pp. 
1449-1450.) 
Mr. Russell disagreed with Mr. Jacobsen's theory of reintroduction of fire. (See, 
e.g., R. 7294 at pp. 1425-1426.) He explained why the "bucket brigade" manned by 
Mr. Ferris would not have had any effect. (R. 7309 at pp. 1545-1546.) In fact, he 
pointed out that the first arriving officer was unsuccessful in extinguishing flames that 
he noted were coming from the inside out. (Id.) 
Mr. Russell explained why damage to the cable was consistent with it being 
damaged by a fire rather than being at the point of origin. (R. 7298 at p. 1456.) He also 
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explained that damage to the cable was not consistent with the fire starting in that 
location as significantly more damage would have been expected. (R. 7297 at pp. 1445-
1446 and 1449.) He also explained that the fire touching on the power cord of the cable 
would have caused an arc that would trip the breaker. (R. 7297 at p. 1444.) Plaintiffs' 
theory of a clip impinging the cable is not substantiated by damage to the cable at any 
other location. (R. 7297 at p. 1443.) Mr. Russell observed damage to a nearby cable 
television wire similar to damage observed on the roof deicing cable, suggesting that such 
damage was caused by a fire rather than at the point of origin. (R. 7297 at p. 1442.) 
Mr. Russell's testimony was critical of Plaintiffs' origin experts. Mr. Jacobsen 
clearly misplaced artifacts and otherwise improperly handled other artifacts. (R. 7292-
7293 at pp. 1410-1413.) Plaintiffs' experts left important evidence at the fire scene, 
including wood remnants. (R. 7295 at pp. 1429-1431.) They failed to follow the 
scientific method. (R. 7299 at pp. 1461-1462.) They also failed to examine the building 
at the time of demolition for any evidence that might point to another area of origin. (R. 
7299 at p. 1460.) Plaintiffs' experts could easily have identified the manufacturer of this 
cable (R. 7299-7300 at pp. 1466-1467), but they did not do so until significantly later 
(after the buildings were demolished) when Plaintiffs wanted to file a lawsuit. 
Mr. Russell also discredited many of Mr. Jacobsen's opinions, noting, for instance, that 
he made mistaken assumptions about the existence of fire chases and particle board 
between rafters, which were more likely drywall. (R. 7294 at p. 1422.) In short, Mr. 
Russell's testimony severely undermined the credibility of Plaintiffs' origin evidence. 
b. Dr. Ogle 
Dr. Ogle holds a Ph.D. in chemical engineering and did specific Ph.D. research in 
the field of combustion. (R. 7359 at p. 1806.) He initially worked in the defense industry 
applying combustion science to weapons systems for the government (R. 7359 at pp. 
1805-1806), and later joined Packer Engineering, where he was Vice President of 
Chemical Engineering at the time of trial. He also has education and training related 
specifically to the science of polymers such as PVC — the material from which the jacket 
of the cable was made. (E.g., R. 7359 at pp. 1807-1808.) 
Based upon his training, education and experience (including approximately 400 
fire investigations — (R. 7360 at pp. 1809-1810)), Dr. Ogle agreed that the fire did not 
originate where alleged by Plaintiffs' experts. (See, e.g., R. 7361-7362 at pp. 1819-1828.) 
Among the many facts Dr. Ogle relied upon for this opinion were the following: 
The fascia board to which the cable allegedly was attached was about three-quarter 
inches thick, on a vertical surface. Accordingly, the fire would have had to burn openly 
for a full hour before breaking through since flames spread upwards, outwards and even 
downwards faster than they would have spread inward. (R. 7361 at pp. 1820-1822.) In 
other words, for Plaintiffs to be right, this fire would have had to be burning on the 
exterior of the building for about an hour before it penetrated through the fascia, and 
therefore should have resulted in substantially more damage at the exterior. (R. 7361 at 
pp. 1821-1823.) This is entirely inconsistent with the observations of the firefighters. 
(E.g., R. 7065 at pp. 100-101; R. 7066 at p. 104.) 
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Dr. Ogle's independent review of the burn patterns shown in photographs and 
actual artifacts was consistent with Mr. Russell's (i.e., the pattern showed a fire burning 
from the building interior toward the exterior, not the other way around). (R. 7362 at p. 
1862.) For example, Dr. Ogle noted that the fascia board artifact obtained by Plaintiffs at 
or near the point at which the Plaintiffs claim the cable was attached showed charring on 
the inside, rather than the outside. (R. 7365 at p. 1854.) He also noted that the rafters 
should have been more damaged by the fire. (R. 7362 at p. 1826.) 
Dr. Ogle explained why the Plaintiffs' theory of later redirection of fire to the rear 
of the building to account for the damage seen is inaccurate. (R. 7362 at pp. 1826-1827.) 
Damage to the cable itself was not consistent with it being at the point of origin. (R. 
7361 at p. 1824.) Moreover, damage to the adjacent building was consistent with hot 
gases moving from the interior of the building to the exterior. (R. 7362 at p. 1828.) 
Dr. Ogle also opined that the roof deicing cable did not cause the fire. (See, e.g., 
R. 7362 at pp. 1828-1830.) Among other things, Dr. Ogle testified to the following facts 
and opinions that undermined Plaintiffs' causation theories: 
Dr. Ogle explained that PVC experiences pyrolysis but does not ignite. It gives 
off a hydrocholoric acid vapor that actually acts as a fire suppressant. (R. 7362 at p. 
1829.) Dr. Ogle stated that the fault hypothesized by Plaintiffs' experts would not ignite 
or sustain ignition of the PVC jacket. (R. 7362-7363 at pp. 1832-1834.) Dr. Ogle 
testified that the autoignition temperature for PVC is approximately 900° Fahrenheit. (R. 
12
 Attached as Addendum 1 is a true and correct copy of Trial Exhibit 300, which 
summarizes Defendants' experts' opinions. 
7363 at p. 1833.) (Plaintiffs' experts' hypothetical calculations only claimed to generate 
temperatures of 330° Fahrenheit; Dr. Becherer testified the temperature generated by 
Mr. Kilgore's calculations was actually 174° Fahrenheit, far short of the autoignition 
temperature required. (R. 7315 at pp. 1588-1589).) 
Dr. Ogle also stated the basis for his opinion that the wood fascia board to which 
the cable allegedly was attached would not ignite even with burning PVC. (R. 7363-7364 
at pp. 1838-1841.) In short, even if the PVC ignited, the amount of fuel available to burn 
in contact with the wood was so small that only transient ignition could possibly result. 
Once that fuel was consumed, the wood would no longer continue to burn. The flame 
also does not continue to burn along the axis of the cable because PVC does not propa-
gate a flame. Dr. Ogle used actual measured test values for burning PVC to determine 
that it was not a competent ignition source in this case. (R. 7365 at pp. 1851-1855.) 
Like Dr. Becherer, Dr. Ogle found Mr. Kilgore's laboratory tests to be irrelevant. 
(R. 7364 at pp. 1842-1843.) Dr. Ogle likened Plaintiffs' hypothesized fault theory to 
attempting to start the side of the building on fire with a common kitchen match. 
(R. 7364 at p. 1848.) 
Dr. Ogle also undermined the theories of Dr. Babrauskas after reviewing that 
expert's deposition, his written reports, the fascia samples tested and his affidavit. (See 
R. 7364 at p. 1846.) In this connection, Dr. Ogle testified that Plaintiffs had 
mischaracterized Dr. Babrauskas' testimony, which was much more narrow than 
described in court. (See R. 7364 at pp. 1847-1848.) 
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Dr. Ogle explained concepts of heat sink, heat release and heat flux. (See R. 7365 
at pp. 1849-1851.) He explained that the heat generated from the hypothetical fault 
would not all be transferred to the board but would radiate in all directions. Moreover, 
conduction by the cable itself would move heat down the axis of the grounding braid. 
(14 at 1851.) 
Dr. Ogle examined both the test results and artifacts from tests performed at the 
direction of Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Babrauskas. He explained in great detail how those 
test results actually supported his theory that the cable was not a competent ignition 
source. (R. 7366 at pp. 1860-1864 and R. 7367 at p. 1865.) The sample showed only 
transient ignition that would not have sustained itself after their pilot light was removed. 
0<L) 
c. Dr. Becherer 
Dr. Becherer holds a Ph.D. focusing on experimental methodologies in 
engineering fields. (R. 7311 at pp. 1556-1558.) His testimony included a review and 
analysis of Mr. Kilgore's tests and opinions. Dr. Becherer testified that he had reviewed 
and evaluated Mr. Kilgore's tests, had looked at his calculations, and had reviewed 
reference material included in Mr. Kilgore's deposition. (R. 7314 at p. 1579.) 
Dr. Becherer had been present to hear the oral proffer and had read the written proffer of 
Mr. Kilgore's testimony. Id. 
Dr. Becherer concluded nothing Mr. Kilgore had done by way of testing or 
examination was even relevant to the question of whether this roof deicing cable caused 
the fire or was defectively designed. (R. 7314 at pp. 1579-1580.) Dr. Becherer found that 
Mr. Kilgore had done nothing to attempt to relate his theoretical temperatures from a 
laboratory to what actually occurred on the outside of the 436 Main building on the night 
of June 15, 1993 in Park City, Utah. (Id at p. 1581.) In other words, Mr. Kilgorefs 
opinions were limited to theoretical temperatures as to how hot a cable might reach under 
lab conditions, rather than calculated to what actually could have happened at the actual 
location, where outside air, winds, and the like would dissipate heat. Id. Mr. Kilgore's 
numbers were derived, in part, from using a heat lamp held over a piece of plywood in a 
laboratory to which an energized cable was fastened. Mr. Kilgore randomly concluded 
that he thought that the 436 Main roof would be about 120° Fahrenheit. However, he had 
no evidence or reason to believe that a vertical surface outdoors, on a piece of fascia 
board, at night, would be that temperature. (Id. at p.l 583.) Dr. Becherer then noted how 
Mr. Kilgore took a razor and cut the cable and got it to "sputter", but did not report any 
cable failure or fire. Rather, Mr. Kilgore simply observed steam or smoke, though even 
Mr. Kilgore was not sure which. (Id. at p.l 586.) None of Plaintiffs' experts has 
replicated the alleged fault producing anything close to sustained ignition of a wood 
fascia board. 
Dr. Becherer also testified that the oral proffer of testimony presented to Judge 
Thorne by Plaintiffs' counsel was incorrect. (R. 7315 at p. 1588.) Plaintiffs' counsel had 
proffered that Mr. Kilgore could show that the cable in question could produce 
temperatures in excess of 330° Fahrenheit.13 However, Dr. Becherer testified that the 
13
 Plaintiffs continue to make this assertion in their appeal brief. (App. Brief at 21.) 
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tests Mr. Kilgore performed actually only verified temperatures to 174° Fahrenheit, rather 
than the 330° Fahrenheit proffered by counsel. (Li at pp. 1588-1589.) 
Dr. Becherer explained to the court how Mr. Kilgorefs mathematical calculations 
were entirely irrelevant because there was no conversion of watts (an energy rating which 
Mr. Kilgore's calculations were based upon) into temperature. (R. 7316 at p. 1598.) 
(Dr. Becherer explained how that conversion is nearly impossible to accurately make, 
stating that it would take a Ph.D. student years to make and would be grounds for 
dissertation research project since there are innumerable variations. (Id at pp. 1598-
1599.).) He also noted that Mr. Kilgore conceded that it was impossible to accurately 
adjust from watts to temperature. (Id.) Therefore, Mr. Kilgore's "mathematical 
calculations" had very little, if any, bearing on what occurred in the subject deicing cable 
on the building in question. 
After a lengthy discussion on the physics of the tests involved, Dr. Becherer 
summarized for the trial court: "And so I went through all of this exercise to basically 
just say this test really has no meaning and no applicability in this case." (R. 7316 at p. 
1596.) In short. Plaintiffs' apparent disbelief that the trial court did not simply adopt 
Mr. Kilgore's opinions ignores the numerous problems with his opinions of which Judge 
Thorne was well aware. 
C. Plaintiffs1 Have Also Failed to Demonstrate Why Judge Thornefs 
Ruling Based on Defendants1 Evidence is Clearly Erroneous. 
In addition to failing to marshal the evidence, Plaintiffs have failed to adequately 
explain why Judge Thome's conclusions were clearly erroneous in light of Defendants1 
11 
evidence. Plaintiffs repeat on appeal the mistake they made below; namely, confusing 
quantity of evidence with quality of evidence. 
With respect to the origin evidence, for example, Plaintiffs make conclusory 
allegations and spend an inordinate amount of time attacking Mr. Russell's opinion about 
the fire originating in the attic above the showroom. (See at App. Brief at 38-39.) 
However, neither Defendants nor Judge Thorne were obligated to find another point of 
origin; instead, Plaintiffs were obligated to convince Judge Thorne more probably than 
not that their alleged point of origin, about nine inches below the fascia board on the 
exterior of the building, was indeed where the fire started. Plaintiffs make no effort to 
explain why Judge Thorne was constrained to believe Plaintiffs' experts, who could not 
agree among themselves and, even at times, with their own prior opinions, about where 
this fire started, or to disbelieve Defendants' experts. Critical discrepancies between 
whether the fire started on the inside or the outside at the southeast corner, above, at or 
below the roof line, or in some three dimensional cubical area go unanswered by 
Plaintiffs.14 
Plaintiffs effort to explain away causation evidence is equally unpersuasive. 
Plaintiffs begin with a boot strap analysis that because the proof of origin is so 
overwhelming, the admitted dispute between qualified experts about the competence of 
14
 Plaintiffs do try to explain that the damage at the southeast corner was less 
because of the effort of the bucket brigade, ignoring Judge Thome's right to disbelieve 
this incredible testimony, as well as Defendants' expert's explanation of why this did not 
happen and why Plaintiffs' theory of a laser-beam-like fire penetrating to the interior, 
without damaging more of the exterior, was not at all persuasive. Moreover, as noted 
above, the testimony was in dispute about what the fire department observed and fought 
when it first arrived at the scene of the fire. 
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the cable of an ignition source is irrelevant. See App. Brief at 42-43. Thus, Plaintiffs' 
argument is premised entirely on the erroneous assumption that their evidence about 
origin was overwhelming, which obviously it was not. Furthermore, Plaintiffs ignore 
how the evidence concerning the competence of the cable as an ignition source under the 
circumstances influences the origin evidence. The less likely the cable is to be a source 
of ignition, the less likely it is that Plaintiffs' origin experts are right about their 
inconsistent theories concerning where the fire started. 
Finally, Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate how alleged defects in the cable 
proximately caused the fire. Since Dr. Ogle testified, for example, that a ground fault in 
this cable, under these circumstances, was an incompetent ignition source, then it did not 
matter whether the breaker would have tripped or not with the addition of a GFCI (i.e., 
the alleged defect would not be a proximate cause). 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED ALL EVIDENCE 
BEFORE IT WHEN IT DISMISSED THE STRICT LIABILITY CLAIM. 
Plaintiffs complain that Judge Thome considered and relied upon "negligence 
factors" when he dismissed their strict liability claim. Plaintiffs argue, in essence, that 
the trier of fact should have considered their experts' opinions, but should have ignored 
the product's safety history, its compliance with rigorous design standards established by 
an independent, internationally recognized testing laboratory, its compliance with a 
nationally promulgated electrical code that is adopted statewide in Utah, and its 
compliance with industry standards. This argument misinterprets Utah law involving 
strict liability which required Plaintiffs to convince Judge Thorne that the heat cable was 
"unreasonably dangerous" as specifically defined at Utah Code Ann. §78-15-6. In 
addition, Plaintiffs' position is inconsistent with the vast majority of courts who have 
addressed these issues, as well as the secondary authority cited by Plaintiffs themselves. 
A. The Prior History of ADKS Roof Deicing Cable is Probative on the 
Issue of Design Defect. 
Plaintiffs stipulated at trial, without limitation, that Defendant Heron had received 
no claims of fire in association with its ADKS roof deicing cable in the approximately 30 
years the cable had been available on the market prior to this incident in June 1993. 
(R. 6312-6313.) Judge Thome made a specific Finding on this very matter. (R. 6670 at 
H 15.) Plaintiffs mistakenly argue that this stipulated fact is relevant to notice and 
knowledge but not to design defect. 
To establish that a product is unreasonably dangerous, a Plaintiff must prove, 
among other things, the likelihood or probability of harm arising from the alleged design 
defect. See Utah Code Ann. §78-15-6 (consider product's characteristics, propensities, 
risks, etc.) Indeed, one of the very authorities relied upon by Plaintiffs at oral argument 
and in their motion for a new trial was Restatement (Third) Torts: Products Liability 
(1998) ("Restatement Third"). That authority expressly notes the significance of a 
product's safety history. Restatement Third, § 2, cmt. fat 22-23.15 The Restatement 
Third recognizes that a "broad range of factors" may be considered in determining 
whether an alternative design is reasonable and whether its omission renders the product 
15
 The Restatement Third reiterates this position by acknowledging that since there is 
danger in every product, the relevant inquiry is the frequency and seriousness of the 
danger arising from the alleged defect. Id., § 2, Rpt. Note to Cmt. d at 81. 
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unreasonably dangerous. Among the things the trier should consider is the magnitude 
and probability of the foreseeable risk of harm. (Id.) In this case, the forseeability, 
probability, and magnitude of harm are best reflected by a 30-year track record of safe 
operation of the product without the design alternatives recommended by Plaintiffs' 
experts. 
B. Evidence of State-of-the-Art in Design is Relevant in a Strict Liability 
Case, 
Plaintiffs want a reversal and new trial ordered because Judge Thorne considered, 
in part, state-of-the-art evidence on the issue of design defect. (See R. 6670 at f^ 14 and 
R. 6672 at ^ 2.) Plaintiffs never denied that the cable was state-of-the-art in 1989 when it 
was manufactured and in 1991 when it was installed, and did not object to introduction of 
such evidence during trial. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs argued later that state-of-the-art 
evidence was irrelevant in a strict products liability case, while citing Judge Thorne to 
authorities that actually acknowledged the probative value of such evidence. See, e.g.. 
Restatement Third, § 2, Cmt. b at 19. ("How this defendant's design compares with other 
competing designs in actual use is relevant to the issue of whether the defendant's design 
is defective.") 
Plaintiffs mistakenly assume that state-of-the-art evidence is relevant only in a 
negligence case. Plaintiffs can cite to no such authority in Utah. Moreover, the vast 
majority of courts who have considered the issue find state-of-the-art evidence relevant 
in a strict products liability case. See Restatement Third, § 2, Rpt. Note to cmt. d at 81-
84.16 Also, it is the position of the Tenth Circuit that state-of-the-art evidence is 
admissible in a strict liability case. See Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 544 F.2d 442, 
447 (10th Cir. 1976) ("state-of-the-art evidence helps to determine the expectation of the 
ordinary consumer"). The Tenth Circuit has held that when it applies Utah law, a 
plaintiff in a strict liability action must prove that "an alternative, safer design, practical 
under the circumstances, was available at the time the [product was] sold." Allen v. 
Minnstar, Inc., 8 F.3d 1470, 1479 (10th Cir. 1993). Although Plaintiffs' memorandum 
cites to three or four cases from jurisdictions limiting the use of state-of-the-art evidence, 
those cases state a distinctly minority position. ( See cases catalogued at Restatement 
Third § 2; Rpt. Note to Cmt. d at 83.) 
Legal scholars also support the use of state-of-the-art evidence in strict liability 
cases. For instance, Restatement Third takes the position that state-of-the-art evidence 
16
 See e^. Ricks v. General Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195, 202 (Mont. 1986) (test is 
whether at time of manufacture an alternative design product "was both technologically 
feasible and a marketable reality"); Voss v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co., 450 
N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1983) (manufacturer's duty is to develop a feasible alternative within 
the state-of-the-art at time of production); Cantu v. John Deere Co., 603 P.2d 839, 841 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1979) (state-of-the-art evidence relevant as probative to expectation of 
ordinary consumer); Caterpiller Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 887 (Alaska 1979) 
(jury may consider state-of-the-art in deteniiining defective product design) (modified by 
statute on unrelated grounds). 
A complete list of the cases cited by the Reporter to the Restatement Third as 
allowing state-of-the-art evidence in strict liability cases, together with cases listed in a 
law review article described therein, is attached as Addendum 2 to this brief. The list 
includes cases from the following jurisdictions: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New York, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, West Virginia and Wyoming. This note also lists 
numerous other states which have adopted statutes allowing state-of-the-art evidence or 
even state-of-the-art defenses to strict liability claims. 
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not only is relevant, but in cases where state-of-the-art is shown, it may be exceedingly 
difficult for a plaintiff to prove that an alternative design was truly practicable. 
Restatement Third, § 2, Cmt. d at 20. Restatement Third also agrees that industry 
standards are probative of whether omission of a design feature rendered the product 
unreasonably dangerous. Id17 State-of-the-art provides relevant evidence for a number 
of reasons. Such evidence is probative of what an ordinary consumer can reasonably 
expect. It also obviously is relevant with respect to technological and economic 
feasibility. If the industry is not using a particular design feature that will result in 
significant costs to a single manufacturer who incorporates it into its product, then that is 
a consideration in whether this design feature truly is economically feasible. In this case, 
for example, no other manufacturer of roof deicing cable incorporated integral GFCI. If 
Easy Heat and Heron had been compelled to incorporate those features, then Easy Heat 
and Heron would be at a competitive disadvantage and would simply withdraw from that 
market. Consumers, therefore, would not have available a product with integral GFCI; 
instead, they would simply have the competitors' products without this unnecessary 
feature. 
Finally, state-of-the-art evidence is party neutral. In other words, it can be used 
both as a sword by a plaintiff and as a shield by a defendant without being dispositive. 
1
' The Restatement Third takes the position that state-of-the-art evidence is not 
necessarily dispositive. It suggests that when an expert opines that state-of-the-art is 
inadequate, the court may, but is not required to, agree with that conclusion. Id. In this 
case, Judge Thome clearly disagreed with any of Plaintiffs' experts' opinions, if any, that 
could be construed as critical of state-of-the-art in the design of roof deicing cables. 
IQ 
E.g. Moulton v. Rival Co., 116 F.3d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1997) (design defect established 
where similar products did not contain the safety feature of defendant's product and 
Underwriters' Laboratories refused to list the product). 
C. Canadian Standards Association ("CSA") and National Electrical 
Code ("NEC") Standards Provided Relevant and Substantial Evidence 
for Judge Thome's Conclusion that the Product was not Defective in 
Design. 
The parties stipulated that the subject ADKS roof deicing cable at all times 
complied with CSA testing and listing standards, and had done so for a period of 
approximately 30 years prior to this incident. (R. 6312-6313.) The NEC is promulgated 
by the National Fire Protection Association and is adopted statewide in Utah as discussed 
in greater detail below. The evidence at trial showed compliance of the cable with all 
NEC provisions applicable to roof deicing cable as well, including NEC's adoption of 
CSA listing standards for this product. Judge Thorne made specific findings of 
compliance with both of these standards. (R. 6670 at ^ 11-13.) He included compliance 
with CSA and NEC requirements among the litany of reasons he gave for finding that the 
product was not defective in design. (See, R. 6672 at j^ 2 (i.e., he did not give Defendants 
the benefit of the statutory rebuttal presumption)). Therefore, Plaintiffs certainly are not 
entitled to a reversal regardless of whether CSA or NEC standards are or are not 
"government standards." 
Significantly, even Plaintiffs conceded that CSA and NEC standards have 
evidentiary value. See, e.g. Plaintiffs' Memo in Support of Motion for New Trial at 17 
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(R. 6751). One of Plaintiffs' own experts, Edward Schaefer, an electrical engineer, 
testified that CSA standards tend to be superior to and safer than Underwriters' 
Laboratories' standards. (R. 7144 at p. 547.) Moreover, Mr. Schaefer testified that CSA 
tests for a variety of things, including safety issues and product misuse. (R. 7144 at 
p. 548.) One of Defendants' experts, Dr. Becherer, thoroughly examined the standards 
and attested to their rigorousness in evaluating the design of this particular product. 
(R. 7313 at pp. 1572-1578.) The standards at issue here addressed the very design issues 
at the heart of Plaintiffs' case and did not require the design elements Plaintiffs' experts' 
recommended even as of the time of trial. (R.7314 at pp. 1579-1580.) 
Utah law expressly adopts the NEC in this state. Utah Code Ann. §58-56-4(2) and 
(3). The NEC has been promulgated to protect persons and property from electrical 
hazards. NEC, Article 90-1.19 The NEC applies to installation of electrical equipment, 
which is broadly defined. kL, Article 90-2 and Article 100 (definition of "Equipment"). 
In fact, Article 426 applies specifically to roof deicing cable, providing detailed design 
and installation guidelines. See Article 426, including Article 426-1 for scope and 426-2 
for definition of heating system. The NEC further provides that equipment is acceptable 
only if approved. See id, Article 110-2. Approval means that it is acceptable to the 
authority having jurisdiction, in this case Park City. See id., Article 100 (definition of 
"Approved"). Approval is achieved through listing or labeling a product. Labeling is 
18
 It would be anomalous for a court to admit an individual expert's opinion about 
design defect while excluding a professional engineering society's opinion as expressed 
in written standards for that specific product. 
19
 Attached as Addendum 3 are copies of the cited portions of the NEC. 
defined by the NEC to mean approval by an independent testing organization such as 
CSA. See id, Article 100 (definition of "Labeled"). 
Judge Thorne did not find compliance with CSA or NEC dispositive, nor did he 
grant Defendants the benefit of a rebuttable presumption that the cable was not defective 
based on compliance with those standards. All Judge Thorne did was consider the 
evidentiary value of compliance with such standards. In short, the standards are in the 
nature of state-of-the-art evidence and, for the same reasons, may properly be considered 
in a strict liability case either as a non-dispositive sword of a plaintiff or shield for a 
defendant. 
D. Judge Thome's Alleged Error in Considering This Evidence Would 
Also be Harmless in Light of His Other Findings and Conclusions. 
Plaintiffs ignore Judge Thome's specific finding and conclusion that the cable, as 
designed, would not be considered unreasonably dangerous by an ordinary consumer, 
much less by a consumer who hired professionals to select the cable and install it. 
(R. 6672.) Judge Thorne noted that ordinary consumers are well-versed in the hazards of 
electrical products, especially when they have been abused. (R. 7397-7398 at pp. 1976-
1977.) Indeed, Plaintiffs' entire theory of how this fire started was based on abuse of the 
product rather than a fire that occurred as a result of its normal and expected operation 
(i.e., cable located where it should not have been, damaged in installation and energized 
when it should not have been). Moreover, the sequence of events hypothesized by 
Moreover, any error in the admissibility of this evidence would be harmless as no 
one factor was dispositive or given undue weight by the trial court. See UTCO Assoc. 
Ltd. v.Zimmerman, 2001 UTApp. 117, ITU 31 -34, 27 P.3d 177; Hall v. NACM 
Intermountain, Inc., 1999 UT 97, H 21, 988 P.2d 942. 
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Plaintiffs' expert to create the fault starts with the premise the cable caused the fire and 
works backwards, and was so improbable that no ordinary consumer would find the 
design of the cable at fault. (See R. 7289-7291) (cable penetrates outer PVC jacket, 
aluminum braid and inner PVC jacket of neutral wire causing closed neutral to ground 
fault that later opens; but does not cause hot to ground or hot to neutral fault, etc.) 
Hence, any alleged error by Judge Thorne in considering evidence of listing standards, 
state-of-the-art or the other evidence about which Plaintiffs complain would be harmless. 
It is the axiom of Utah law that harmless error does not mandate reversal. Hall 988 P.2d 
at 947 (Utah 1999) ("We do not reverse the trial court for committing harmless error."); 
see also UTCO Assoc. Ltd. v. Zimmerman. 2001 UTApp. 117,1fl| 31-34, 27 P.3d 177 
(same). 
Judge Thome's alleged error is also harmless by reason of his independent finding 
that Plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of proving an economically feasible 
alternative design. (R. 6671 at <[] 17.) Utah is among those states that requires a plaintiff 
in a strict liability case to prove that an economically feasible alternative design is 
available. See e^g. Allen, 8 F.3d at 1479. The Restatement Third has also identified Utah 
as one of the states that imposes this requirement. Restatement Third, § 2, Rpt. Notes to 
Cmt. d, at 59. 
Plaintiffs have not alleged that this specific finding was insufficient as stated or 
that it was against the clear weight of evidence. In fact, Plaintiffs have marshaled 
absolutely no evidence with respect to this finding other than noting their own experts9 
testimony about some telephone calls he made to attempt to ascertain the price of an 
integral GFCL App. Brief at 24. Having failed to marshal evidence on this issue or 
contest this finding, Plaintiffs' appeal on the issue of their strict liability design defect 
claim fails as this proof was an essential element of their claim. 
Moreover, even if Plaintiffs' appeal brief can be read to properly raise this issue, 
the evidence overwhelmingly supports Judge Thome's conclusion. Plaintiffs have 
completely ignored the stipulation of facts executed by the parties which provided 
detailed information about the cost of manufacturing the subject cable. (R. 6313 at fflj 13-
17 and R. 6314 at ffij 23-24.) Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Edward Schaffer, was completely 
unfamiliar with these costs. (R. 7146 at p. 560.) He conceded that in addition to the out-
of-pocket costs, there would be additional costs, including manufacturing costs associated 
with retooling, to accommodate this design change. (R. 7146 at pp. 560-562.) 
Dr. Schaffer's own cost estimates, even without these additional costs factored in, 
demonstrated that the alternative design would cost more than the product itself. (R. 
7146 at pp. 563-566.) Further, Dr. Schaffer conceded that incorporating GFCI into the 
product would not necessarily obviate the need to still add GFCl protection to the branch 
wire circuitry under applicable codes. (R. 7144 at p. 551.) 
Defendants' expert, Dr. Becherer, also concluded that an integral GFCI device was 
cost-prohibitive. (R. 7313 at p. 1571.) Unlike Dr. Schaffer, Defendants' expert actually 
considered the cost of manufacturing the product and concluded that the design 
alternative proposed by Plaintiffs would cost more than the device itself. Accordingly, in 
Dr. Becherer's opinion, an integral GFCI was certainly not an economically feasible 
design that should be incorporated integrally into the product. (R. 7312 at p. 1566.) 
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Accordingly, there was ample evidence for Judge Thome's conclusion that Plaintiffs had 
failed to meet their burden of proving up an economically feasible alternative design. 
Since this was an essential element of their proof on their design claim, the design claim 
fails regardless of whether Judge Thome improperly considered, as Plaintiffs allege, 
evidence of listing standards, prior fires, and other evidence about which they complain. 
V. PLAINTIFFS9 APPEAL FROM THE ORDER OF PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT DISMISSING THEIR WARNINGS CLAIM IS WITHOUT 
MERIT. 
Plaintiffs also appeal from an order of partial summary judgment entered by Judge 
Quinn dismissing Plaintiffs' claims that the fire in question was caused by allegedly 
defective warnings. This Court need not consider Plaintiffs' appeal on this issue for two 
reasons. First, if Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that the cable was 
at the origin of and was the cause of the fire, then Plaintiffs' warnings claims are 
completely irrelevant. Second, Plaintiffs have failed to adduce on appeal the evidence 
that would show a causal relationship between alleged, but unidentified, deficiencies in 
the warnings and this fire. In the absence of any evidence adduced by Plaintiffs about 
how their warnings claims would have made any difference in the outcome of the case, 
the appeal is without merit. 
Still, if the argument is considered, it is no more complex than a simple assertion 
that there could have been a dispute of fact as to how thoroughly the roofer who installed 
the cable read the instructions in question. Plaintiffs rely on one answer from a 
deposition transcript to try and create a "disputed fact" out of wholecloth. Plaintiffs' 
efforts fall far short of the burden they carry in establishing that the ruling was erroneous. 
A. Standard to Overturn Summary Judgment 
It is well established that summary judgment is only appropriate when the material 
facts regarding the issue are not in dispute. Heglar Ranch, Inc. v. Stillman, 619 P.2d 
1390, 1391 (Utah 1980). However, summary judgment is not precluded by the mere 
dispute of some alleged fact. Rather, summary judgment will be avoided only when a 
material fact is in genuine controversy such that reasonable minds could differ as to the 
interpretation thereof. See id- Here, there is no genuine controversy of a material fact 
that would have, in any way, modified anyone's course of conduct as it related to the 
subject cable. Hence, as shown below, summary judgment on the warnings claim was 
proper. 
B. Undisputed Facts Relating To The Warnings Claim Omitted By 
Plaintiffs. 
Plaintiffs refer this Court to one answer to one question in the deposition of the 
roofer Harvey Fowler to try to establish a question of fact. However, the undisputed facts 
relied upon by the trial court in concluding that the thoroughness of the instructions 
which accompanied the product had no bearing on this fire were, in part, as follows: 
1. When Mr. Harvey Fowler, as an employee of Moon Roofing Company, 
installed the cable on the building, he did not read through the instructions and warnings 
that accompanied the deicing cable. (R. 3412.) Rather, Mr. Fowler stated that he only 
"glanced" at the diagrams on the instruction sheet for the sole purpose of seeing how the 
cable was laid out, Le^ , the "zig-zag" pattern on the roof. (R. 3414.) 
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2. Mr. Fowler is certain that he did not read the instructions and warnings that 
came with the cable in any detail. (Id.) 
3. Mr. Fowler did not provide a copy of the instructions and warnings that 
came with the cable to the electrician, the owner of the building, or its tenants. (Id.) 
4. The dedicated branch circuitry for the deicing cable was installed at the 436 
Main building by Mr. Michael Mawson, an employee of Alpine Electric Company. 
Mr. Mawson did not read the instructions and warnings at all before he installed the 
circuitry, nor did he even see them. (R. 3416-3417 at pp. 53-54.) 
5. At the time the deicing cable was installed, the 436 Main building was 
occupied by Quality Interiors, Inc., which company is owned and operated by Deon and 
Kerry Hale. Neither ever saw the instructions or warnings that accompanied the deicing 
cable. (R. 3419 at pp. 24-26; R. 3421 at p. 19.) 
6. The owner of the 436 Main building, Ms. Melva Garcia, never read the 
instructions and warnings that accompanied the cable, nor was she provided with a copy 
of the instructions and warnings by either the installer or electrician. (R. 3406-3407.)21 
7. Moreover, Ms. Garcia testified that neither the installer nor electrician 
discussed the content of the warnings and instructions with her, nor advised her of the 
This fact was particularly important since most of the alleged deficiencies with 
Easy Heat's instructions, according to Plaintiffs, was a failure to provide additional 
information explaining why certain optional devices, such as a ground fault circuit 
interrupter (GFCI) or a Roof Sentry Control Switch, were recommended by Easy Heat to 
accompany its product. However, since the owner of the building was never aware that 
such devices were recommended, no reasonable jury could conclude that Ms. Garcia 
would have modified her conduct if additional materials explaining why Easy Heat 
recommended those devices were included in the instructions. Thus, the trial court 
properly determined that Plaintiffs' warning claims failed as a matter of law. 
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existence of any recommended optional devices (such as a ground fault circuit 
interrupter) that were listed in the instructions and warnings. (R. 3408.) 
C Plaintiffs1 Claims For An Alleged Failure To Warn Were Properly 
Dismissed. 
1. The Warnings Were Not the Cause in Fact or Proximate Cause 
of Damage. 
"In any failure to warn case a plaintiff must show that the failure to give an 
adequate warning in fact caused the injury; Le^ that had warnings been provided, the 
injured party would have altered his use of the product or taken added precautions to 
avoid the injury." House v. Armour of America, Inc., 929 P.2d 340, 346 (Utah 1996) 
(emphasis added). Stated differently, "if the event which produced the injury would have 
occurred regardless of the defendant's conduct then the failure to provide a warning is not 
the proximate cause of the harm and the plaintiffs claim must fail." House, quoting the 
decision below, House, 886 P.2d 542, 552 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) and Lunt v. Mount 
Spokane Skiing Corp., 814 P.2d 1189, 1194 (Wash. App.), review denied, 822 P.2d 288 
(Wash. 1991). 
In this case, the roofer who installed the cable, the electrician who installed 
circuitry for the cable, and the owner of the building all denied ever reading the 
instructions and warnings. Because Plaintiffs adduced absolutely no evidence that the 
conduct of any of these parties would have been different if the warnings had been 
written in any other manner, they would have been unable to prove that the failure to give 
additional or different warnings had any nexus to the Plaintiffs' injuries. As a matter of 
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law, therefore, Plaintiffs' warning claims were properly dismissed as the warnings could 
not have been the cause in fact nor the proximate cause of Plaintiffs' injuries. 
The soundness of the trial court's ruling that Mr. Fowler, as a matter of fact, did 
not rely upon the warnings was confirmed by 438 Main's own memorandum filed with 
the trial court. Plaintiffs instructed the court that, "In fact, the roofer who installed the 
system was never formally instructed as to the installation of these deicing systems by his 
employer, and barely glanced at the instructions, then threw them away when installation 
was completed." (R. 3757.) (Emphasis added, and deposition citations omitted.) 
Obviously, the Plaintiffs cannot themselves instruct the trial court that the instructions 
were "barely glanced at" and then complain to this Court that there should have been a 
trial to determine whether the instructions were thoroughly read or not. 
Plaintiffs did not. and based upon the available evidence, could not meet their 
burden of showing that the changes they recommend in the instructions and warnings 
would have altered anyone's use of the product. See House, 929 P. 2d at 346. Accord-
ingly, Plaintiffs' warning claims were properly dismissed as a matter of law. See House, 
929 P.2d at 346; see also, Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 682 P.2d 832, 836-37 
(Utah 1984) (failure to warn basis of proper claim only if failure caused plaintiffs 
conduct). 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs have changed the issues and misstated the standards of review on appeal. 
These initial errors have been compounded by Plaintiffs' untimely attack upon and mis-
characterization of Judge Thome's Findings and Conclusions. Plaintiffs have also mis-
AC\ 
construed the basis for Judge Thome's decision which reflects the fact that Judge Thome 
was not persuaded by a preponderance of the evidence of the merits of Plaintiffs' case. 
Plaintiffs have also failed to marshal the evidence with respect to the causation 
issue (and have conceded sufficiency of the evidence on the design defect claim). 
Moreover, there is substantial evidence to support Judge Thome's rulings on both 
causation and design defect and his rulings on those issues clearly were not erroneous. 
Judge Thome relied upon appropriate evidence to find that Plaintiffs had failed to prove 
the design of the product was unreasonably dangerous. Finally, the issue of warnings is 
moot and summary judgment was entirely appropriate as Plaintiffs could not prove any 
causal connection between alleged deficiencies in the warnings and the fire. For all of 
these reasons, Plaintiffs' appeal should be denied. 
DATED: March j ^ ^ 2003. STOEL RlVgjS LLP 
D. Malthew Moscon 
Attorneys for Defendants Easy Heat, Inc., and 
Heron Cable Industries, Ltd. 
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Tabl 
ORIGIN 
1. The fire did not originate at the exterior of the 436 Main building, including the 
exterior southeast corner near the roof line, 
2. The fire did not originate at the interior southeast corner of the storage room 
located at 436 Main. 
3. The available evidence indicates that the most probable point of origin was in 
the space above the tin ceiling in the showroom at 436 Main, west of the common wall 
separating the showroom from the storage area. 
a. The precise point of origin within that space is unknown because the 
evidence was destroyed before it could be examined by Easy Hear and/or Heron's expens. 
b. This area of origin was not thoroughly examined or documented by 
plaintiffs' expens who photographed and examined the scene. 
CAUSE 
1. The cause of the fire at the point of origin is unknown because the available 
evidence was destroyed before it could be examined by Easy Heat and Heron's experts. 
a. The examination and documentation of the area of origin by plaintiffs' 
expens and others was inadequate. Plaintiffs' experts and others did not adhere to the proper 
scientific method in undertaking and completing their examinations of this fire scene. 
2. The subject ADKS roof deicing cable did not cause the fire. 
a. The fire originated at a point remote from the location of the roof deicing 
cable. 
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b. Evidence from the roof deicing cable anifacrs indicates that the cable 
was subject to damage by an ongoing fire event rather than being damaged as a result of 
initiating the subject fire. 
c. A ground fault in the subject roof deicing cable did not initiate this fire, 
nor did it result in the transfer of heat from the exterior to the interior of the building to cause 
this fire. A ground fault in the subject cable is an incompetent ignition source under these 
circumstances. 
3. The ADKS roof deicing cable at issue is not defective in manufacture or design. 
a. Examination of the cable artifacts reveals no evidence suggesting that the 
ADKS roof deicing cable was defective in manufacture. 
b. The subject roof deicing cable complied with all applicable codes and/or 
regulations governing its design. 
(1) The use of aluminum as a grounding oraid is not a design 
defect. Aluminum is commonly used as a grounding conductor and its use 
complied with all applicable codes and/or regulations pertaining to roof deicing 
cables. 
c. There is no documented evidence to indicate that a shingle clip or cable 
spacer was located at the point of the alleged failure approximately 32 inches from the cold 
junction on the roof deicing cable. Moreover, the clips and cable spacers used for this 
installation did not render the product unreasonably dangerous. The clips are manufactured 
using a soft aluminum that bends very easily and does not require compression force of any 
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significant magnitude for installation. The outer PVC jacket on the roof deicmg cable blunts 
any sharpness, if any, in the edges of the dips. 
(1) Examination of the cable artifacts does not demonstrate 
any mechanical penetration of the PVC at locanons where clips or spacers 
allegedly were used for installation. The diameter of the clips and spacers 
available for inspection suggest that they did not compromise the outer PVC 
jacket Where clip locations correspond with penetration of the jacket, there is 
evidence that the PVC in those locations melted as a result of an ongoing fire 
event rather than being compromised by mechanical stress. 
d The physical evidence is insufficient to conclude to a reasonable degree 
of scientific probability or certainty that a ground fault occurred prior to the fire at the location 
approximately 32 inches from the cold junction. Plaintiffs' experts' methodology in arriving at 
this conclusion is not well defined and is seriously flawed. 
(1) The power generated from an alleged ground fault 
between the aluminum grounding braid and the neutral wire with neutral closed 
was insufficient to generate temperatures that would initiate a fire. Further, the 
power generated from a theoretical ground fault between the aluminum 
grounding braid and the neutral wire, with neutral open, is also insufficient to 
generate a fire. 
4. The fault mechanism hypothesized by plaintiffs' experts would not generate 
sufficient heat to ignite either the PVC material around the heatmg elements or the outer PVC 
jacket. 
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a. The theoretical contact resisiance would have pyrolyzed a very small 
amount of insulation without any flame. 
b. The wood fascia board to which the cable allegedly was attached would 
not ignite even with burning PVC. 
c. The igniiion criteria used by plaintiffs' expens are invalid. 
d. The methodology of plaintiffs' expens in simulating environmental 
conditions to which the cable allegedly was subjected is seriously flawed, 
5. The design of the subject roof deicing cable is not defective in the absence of a 
ground fault circuit interrupter and/or thermostatic control. 
a. Codes in effect at the time of this insiallaiion did not even require the 
branch wire circuitry 10 be protected by ground fault protection, which is different from 
ground fault circuit interruption. Current codes do not require that a roof deicing cable itself 
be provided with ground fault circuit interruption as an iniegral pan of the cable or the branch 
wire circuitry. 
b. No code or regulatory requirements in effect at the time of the 
manufacture and installation of this cable, or even subsequently, have required installation of a 
thermostatic control, either in line or as part of the overall assembly. Moreover, installation of 
a thermostatic control in this type of device without a moisiure sensor could defeat the purpose 
of the deicing cable resulting in substantial property damage. 
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WARNINGS 
1. The instructions and warnings that accompanied the subject roof deicing cable 
did not cause or substantially contribute to any of the damage that allegedly occurred in this 
case. 
a. The instructions and warnings were not reviewed by the installer, and 
therefore, did not influence his acts or omissions in connection with this installation, 
b. The evidence indicates that the instructions and warnings were not 
provided to the owner and/or occupant of the 436 Main building. Any alleged deficiencies in 
the instructions and warnings did not, therefore, aftect the acts or omissions of those parties. 
c The evidence indicates that the instructions and warnings were not 
provided to the electrician who installed the dedicated branch circuitry for the roof deicing 
cable. Any alleged deficiencies in the instructions and warnings did not, therefore, affect the 
acts of omissions of the electrician 
2. Many of the alleged deficiencies in the instructions and warnings for the subject 
cable are not consequential because the persons who purchased the product, installed it and7or 
installed the dedicated branch wire circuitry were already familiar with the risks and dangers, 
if any, associated with this product For example, the roofers and the electrician were both 
familiar with GFCI protection and the purpose for such protection Neither elected to provide 
GFCI protection notwithstanding the manufacturer's recommendation, and did not advise the 
owner and/or occupant at 436 Main of the availability of such protection or the purpose it 
might serve 
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3. The instructions and warnings adequately advised a person of reasonable and 
ordinary prudence about the proper method of installation and use of the product as well as the 
risks and dangers, including the risk of fire, associated with failure to properly follow the 
installation and operating instructions. 
4. The evidence demenmares m^nei^us instar.ee: cf hi^nr: srrcr ir which the roof 
deicing cable in question was not installed, maintained, or used in compliance with the clear 
instructions and warnings provided with the product. 
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Tab 2 
CASES ALLOWING CONSIDERATION OF STATE-OF-ART EVIDENCE IN STRICT 
LIABILITY CLAIMS FROM RESTATEMENT (THIRD) PRODUCT LIABILITY AND 
ARTICLES CITED THEREIN 
Raschke v. Carrier Corp., 703 P.2d 556 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Glover v. BIC Corp.. 987 
F.2dl410, 1421-23 (9* Cir. 1993) (applying Oregon law), aff d in part, rev'd in part, on 
other grounds, 6 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1993); Fireboard v. Fenton845 P.2d 1168, 1174 
(Colo. 1993) (en banc) ("state-of-the-art would be an applicable factor in a design defect 
case, if the alternative design suggested by the plaintiff was not practicably feasible in 
light of state-of-the-art at the time the product was manufactured"); Stanczvk v. Black & 
Decker, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 565 (N.D. 111. 1993); Beach v. Outboard Marine Corp., 584 
So.2d 447 (Ala. 1991) (evidence of industry standards at time of manufacture is 
relevant); Elliott v. Brunswick Corp., 903 F.2d 1505 (11th Cir. 1990), reh'g. denied, cert, 
denied, sub nom. Elliott v. Mercury Marine, 498 U.S. 1048; 111 S. Ct. 756; 112 L.Ed. 2d 
776 (1991); Ricks v. General Motors Corp., 723 P.2d 195, 202 (Mont. 1986) (test is 
whether at time of manufacture an alternative design product "was both technologically 
feasible and a marketable reality"); Gosewisch v. American Honda Motor Co.. 737 P.2d 
365, 370 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) opinion vacated in part on other issue, 737 P.2d 376 
(Ariz. 1987) (Arizona statute creating state-of-the-art defense interpreted to mean 
defendant may demonstrate plaintiffs theory of alternative design unfeasible); Wood v. 
Ford Motor Co.. 691 P.2d 495 (Or. Ct. App. 1984); Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 
A.2d 288, 298 (N.H. 1983) (manufacturer only held the standard of what was 
technologically feasible at time of sale or distribution); Foss v. Black & Decker 
Manufacturing Co., 450 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1983) (manufacturer's duty is to develop a 
feasible alternative within the state-of-the-art at time of production); Chown v. USM 
Corp., 297 N.W.2d 218, 220-221 (Iowa 1980); Caterpiller Tractor Co. v. Beck. 593 P.2d 
871, 887 (Alaska 1979) (jury may consider state-of-the-art in determining defective 
product design); Heritage v. Pioneer Brokerage & Sales. Inc.. 604 P.2d 1059, 1063-64 
(Alaska 1979) (jury may properly consider "scientific knowability" of unsafe character of 
product); Sterum. Rueger & Co. v. Day. 594 P.2d 38, 44-45 (Alaska 1979), cert denied. 
454 U.S. 894, 102 S.Ct. 391, 70 L.Ed. 2d 209 (1981), overruled on other grounds, 703 
P.2d 396, 405 (Alaska 1985) (conformance with state-of-the-art may be considered in 
determining whether product is defective); Brady v. Melody Homes Manufacturer. 589 
P.2d 896 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979); Suitter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co.. 406 A.2d 
140, 150-51 (1979); Hancock v. Paccar. Inc., 283 N.W.2d 25, 35 (Neb. 1979); Cantu v. 
John Deer Co., 24 Wash. App. 701, 705; 603 P.2d 839, 841 (1979) (state-of-the-art 
evidence relevant as probative to expectation of ordinary consumer); Morning Star v. 
Black & Decker Manufacturing Co.. 253 S.E.2d 666, 683 (W. Va. 1979); Wilson v. Piper 
Aircraft Corp.. 577 P.2d 1322 (Or. 1978) (en banc), reh'g denied, 579 P.2d 1287 (1978); 
Bunn v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.. 415 F. Supp. 286, 291 (W.D. Pa. 1976), aff d, 556 F.2d 
564 (3d Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 875, 98 S. Ct. 224, 54 L.Ed.2d 154 (1977); 
Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Co.. 527 P.2d 832, 836 (Wyo. 1974) (no safer design 
available "at the time this unit was manufactured"); Bally Doe v. Improved Mach.. Inc.. 
29 Cal.App.3d 633, 640 (1973) (in defective design case strict liability and negligence 
claims merge and "unreasonableness of the danger must necessarily be derived from the 
state-of-the-art at the time of design"); Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W.2d 516, 
519-20 (Tenn. 1973) (reasonableness standard under present state-of-the-art applies to 
automobile design); Olsen v. Arctic Ent, 349 F. Supp. 761, 764-65 (D. Md. 1972) (state-
of-the-art relevant to manufacturer design choice); Garst v. General Motors Corp., 44 
P.2d 47, 61-62 (Kan. 1971). 
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ARTICLE 90 — INTRODUCTION 
Contents 
90-1. Purpose. 
(a) Practical Safeguarding. 
(b) Adequacy. 
(c) Intention. 
90-2. Scope. 
(a) Covered. 
(b) Not Covered. 
(c) Special Permission. 
90-3. Code Arrangement. 
90-4. Enforcement. 
90-5. Formal Interpretations. 
90-6. Examination of Equipment for 
Safety. 
90-7. Wiring Planning. 
(a) Future Expansion and Conve-
nience. 
(b) Number of Circuits in Enclosures. 
90-8. Metric Units of Measurement. 
90-1. Purpose. 
(a) Practical Safeguarding. The purpose of this Code is the practical safeguarding of 
persons and property from hazards arising from the use of electricity. 
The National Electrical Code® (NEC®') is prepared by the NFPA National 
Electrical Code Committee. The scope of this Committee is as follows: 
Scope: This Committee shall consist of a Correlating Committee and Code-
Making Panels. It shall have primary responsibility for preparing documents on 
minimizing the risk of electricity as a source of electric shock and as an ignition 
source of fires and explosions. It shall also be responsible for developing 
requirements to minimize the propagation of fire and explosions due to electrical 
installations. 
The National Electrical Code is the most widely adopted set of electrical safety 
requirements in the world and is offered for use in law and for regulatory purposes 
in the interest of life and property protection. NFPA has available a model state 
law on inspection of electrical installations entitled "The Model Law Providing 
for Inspection of Electrical Installations" (formerly NFPA 70L). The model law 
was prepared by the Electrical Field Service Advisory Committee of the NFPA as a 
guide for those jurisdictions that do not have formalized electrical inspection 
procedures or those that desire to amend their electrical inspection laws, and as a 
guide to adoption of the National Electrical Code. The model law is intended for use 
by states as well as municipalities. 
(b) Adequacy. This Code contains provisions considered necessary for safety. Compliance 
therewith and proper maintenance will result in an installation essentially free from hazard, but not 
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necessarily efficient, convenient, or adequate for good service or future expansion of electrical 
use 
(FPN) Hazards often occur because of overloading of wiring systems by methods or usage not in 
conformity with this Code This occurs because initial wiring did not provide for increases in the use of 
electncit) An initial adequate installation and reasonable provisions for system changes will provide for future 
increases in the use of electncit) 
Consideration should always be given to future expansion in the use of 
electricity Future expansion may not be likely in some occupancies, but in others 
it is wise to plan an initial installation comprised of service-entrance conductors 
and equipment, feeder conductors, and panelboards that will allow for future 
additions, alterations, designs, etc 
(c) Intention This Code is not intended as a design specification nor an instruction manual 
for untrained persons 
The National Electrical Code is intended for use by capable engineers and 
electrical contractors in the basic design and/or installation of electrical 
equipment, by inspection authorities exercising legal jurisdiction over electrical 
installations, by property insurance inspectors, by qualified industrial, commer 
cial, and residential electricians, and by instructors of electrical apprentices or 
students 
90-2. Scope. 
(a) Covered. This Code covers 
(1) Installations of electric conductors and equipment within or on public and private 
buildings or other structures including mobile homes recreational vehicles and floating buildings 
and other premises such as yards carnival, parking and other lots and industrial substations 
(FPN) For additional information concerning such installations in an industrial or multibuildmg complex 
see the National Electrical Safety Code ANSI C2 198" 
Industrial and mulnbuilding complexes (for example, some universities) often 
include substations and other installations employing construction and wiring 
similar to electric utility installations Although such nonutility installations are 
within the scope of the National Electrical Code, the NEC requirements may not 
always be sufficient or complete In such cases, the user can find additional 
information in the National Electrical Safety Code, published by the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc , 345 East 47th St , New York, NY 
10017 
(2) Installations of conductors that connect to the supply of electricity 
(3) Installations of other outside conductors on the premises 
(4) Installations of optical fiber cable 
See Article 770 for the installation requirements for optical fiber cable and 
Article 690 regarding solar photovoltaic systems 
(b) Not Covered This Code does not cover 
(1) Installations in ships watercraft other than floating buildings railway rolling stock 
aircraft or automotive vehicles other than mobile homes and recreational vehicles 
Requirements for floating buildings will be found in Article 553 
(2) Installations underground in mines 
(3) Installations ol railways for generation transformation, transmission or distribution of 
pnwct used exclusively lor operation of rolling stock or installations used exclusively for signahni 
and communication purposes 
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ARTICLE 100—DEFINITIONS 
Reference to the ANSI/NEMA Standard will permit the user to evaluate the 
enclosure with regard to actual conditions of use. See Section 430-91 for motor 
controller enclosure types. 
See paragraph following Table 430-22(a), Exception. 
Duty: 
Continuous Duty: Operation at a substantially constant load for an indefinitely long time. 
Intermittent Duty: Operation for alternate intervals of (l) load and no load; or (2) load and 
rest; or (3) load, no load, and rest. 
Periodic Duty: Intermittent operation in which the load conditions are regularly recurrent. 
Short-Time Duty: Operation at a substantially constant load for a short and definitely 
specified time. 
Varying Duty: Operation at loads, and for intervals of time, both of which may be subject to 
wide variation. 
(FPN): See Table 430-22(a), Exception, for illustration of various types of duty. 
For the protection of intermittent, periodic, short-time, and varying-duty motors 
against overload, see Section 430-33. 
Duty Cycle (Welding): See Section 630-31 (b), Fine Print Note. 
Dwelling: 
Dwelling Unit: One or more rooms for the use of one or more persons as a housekeeping 
unit with space for eating, living, and sleeping, and permanent provisions for cooking and 
sanitation. 
Where dwelling units are referenced throughout the Code, it is important to note 
that rooms of motels, hotels, and similar occupancies could be classified as 
dwelling units where they satisfy the requirements of the definition. See Figure 
100-7. 
Multifamily Dwelling: A building containing three or more dwelling units. 
One-Family Dwelling: A building consisting solely of one dwelling unit. 
Two-Family Dwelling: A building consisting solely of two dwelling units. 
Electric Sign: A fixed, stationary, or portable self-contained, electrically illuminated 
utilization equipment with words or symbols designed to convey information or attract 
attention. 
Enclosed: Surrounded by a case, housing, fence, or walls which will prevent persons from 
accidentally contacting energized parts. 
Enclosure: The case or housing of apparatus, or the fence or walls surrounding an installation 
to prevent personnel from accidentally contacting energized parts, or to protect the equipment 
from physical damage. 
(FPN): For enclosure types, see Enclosures for Electrical Equipment (1000 Volts Maximum), ANSI/NEMA 
250-1985. 
Equipment: A general term including material, fittings, devices, appliances, fixtures, 
apparatus, and the like used as a part of, or in connection with, an electrical installation. 
Equipment Grounding Conductor: See "Grounding Conductor, Equipment." 
See Section 250-91 (b) for types of equipment grounding conductors. 
Explosionproof Apparatus: Apparatus enclosed in a case that is capable of withstanding an 
explosion of a specified gas or vapor which may occur within it and of preventing the ignition of a 
specified gas or vapor surrounding the enclosure by sparks, flashes, or explosion of the gas oi 
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10-9. Interrupting Rating. 
0-10. Circuit Impedance and Other 
Characteristics. 
0-11. Deteriorating Agents. 
0-12. Mechanical Execution of Work. 
(a) Unused Openings. 
(b) Subsurface Enclosures. 
10-13. Mounting and Cooling of 
Equipment. 
(a) Mounting. 
(b) Cooling. 
10-14. Electrical Connections. 
(a) Terminals. 
(b) Splices. 
10-16. Working Space About Electric 
Equipment (600 Volts, Nomi-
nal, or Less). 
(a) Working Clearances. 
(b) Clear Spaces. 
(c) Access and Entrance to Work-
ing Space. 
(d) Front Working Space. 
(e) Illumination. 
(f) Headroom. 
10-17. Guarding of Live Parts (600 
Volts, Nominal, or Less). 
(a) Live Parts Guarded Against 
Accidental Contact. 
(b) Prevent Physical Damage. 
(c) 
110-18. 
110-19. 
110-21. 
110-22. 
Warning Signs. 
Arcing Parts. 
Light and Power from Railway 
Conductors. 
Marking. 
Identification of Disconnecting 
Means. 
B. Over 600 Volts, Nominal 
110-30. 
110-31. 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
110-32. 
110-33. 
(a) 
(b) 
110-34. 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
General. 
Enclosure for Electrical Instal-
lations. 
Indoor Installations. 
Outdoor Installations. 
Metal-Enclosed Equipment Ac-
cessible to Unqualified Persons 
Work Space About Equipment. 
Entrance and Access to Work 
Space. 
Entrance. 
Access. 
Work Space and Guarding. 
Working Space. 
Separation from Low-Voltage 
Equipment. 
Locked Rooms or Enclosures. 
Illumination. 
Elevation of Unguarded Live 
Parts. 
A. General 
0-1. Mandatory Rules and Explanatory Material. Mandatory rules of this Code art 
iracterized by the use of the word "shall." Explanatory material is in the form of Fine Prim 
>tes (FPN). 
In addition to printing explanatory material in fine print (small type), the 
material is further identified in the Code by the term "(FPN)" preceding the 
paragraph. Footnotes to tables, although also in fine print, are not explanatory 
material unless identified by the term "(FPN)"; the footnotes are part of the tables 
and are necessary for the proper use of the tables. For example, see the footnotes 
to Table 310-16. 
The material in Appendices A and B is also explanatory. Appendix A is a 
reference list of text that has been extracted from other NFPA documents. 
Appendix B provides guidance on the use of the general formula in Section 
3lO-15(b). 
LO-2. Approval. The conductors and equipment required or permitted by this Code shall b 
ceptable only if approved. 
(FPN): See Examination of Equipment for Safety, Section 90-6 and Examination, Identification, Installatioi 
id Use of Equipment, Section 110-3. See definitions of "Approved," "Identified," "Labeled," and "Listed." 
Section 110-2 of the Code requires that all equipment be approved as defined in 
Article 100 and, as such, be acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction. Section 
110-3 provides guidance for the judging of equipment and recognizes listing or 
labeling as a means of establishing suitability. 
REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTRICAL INSTALLATIONS—ARTICLE 110 
Approval of equipment is the responsibility of the electrical inspection 
authority, and many such "approvals" are based on tests and listings of testing 
laboratories. 
110-3. Examination, Identification, Installation, and Use of Equipment. 
(a) Examination. In judging equipment, considerations such as the following shall be 
evaluated: 
(1) Suitability for installation and use in conformity with the provisions of this Code. 
Suitability of equipment use may be identified by a description marked on or provided with a 
product to identify the suitability of the product for a specific purpose, environment, or 
application. Suitability of equipment may be evidenced by listing or labeling. 
(2) Mechanical strength and durability, including, for parts designed to enclose and protect 
other equipment, the adequacy of the protection thus provided. 
(3) Wire-bending and connection space. 
(4) Electrical insulation. 
(5) Heating effects under normal conditions of use and also under abnormal conditions likely 
to arise in service. 
(6) Arcing effects. 
(7) Classification by type, size, voltage, current capacity, specific use. 
(8) Other factors which contribute to the practical safeguarding of persons using or likely to 
come in contact with the equipment. 
For wire-bending and connection space in cabinets and cutout boxes, see 
Section 373-6, Tables 373-6(a) and 373-6(b), and Sections 373-7, 373-9, and 
373-11. For wire-bending and connection space in other equipment, see the 
appropriate NEC article and section. For example, see Section 370-18 for outlet, 
device, pull and junction boxes, and conduit bodies; Sections 380-3 and 380-18 for 
switches; Section 384-3 (g) for switchboards and panelboards; and Section 430-10 
for motors and motor controllers. 
(b) Installation and Use. Listed or labeled equipment shall be used or installed in 
accordance with any instructions included in the listing or labeling. 
Installation instructions are usually supplied with equipment by the manufactur-
er for use by the general contractor, erector, electrical contractor, electrical 
inspector, and others concerned with the installation. It is very important to 
consider the listing or labeling installation instructions. For example, Section 
210-52(a), Exception, permits permanently installed electric baseboard heaters to 
be equipped with receptacle outlets that meet the requirements for the wall space 
utilized by such heaters. Installation instructions for such permanent baseboard 
heaters indicate that these heaters should not be mounted beneath a receptacle. In 
dwelling units, it is very common to use low-density heat units that may measure in 
excess of 12 ft in length. Therefore, to meet the provisions of Section 210-52(a), 
first paragraph, and also the installation instructions, a receptacle must either be 
part of the heating unit or be installed in the floor close to the wall but not above 
the heating unit. See Section 210-52(a), Exception, FPN, and Figures 210-26 and 
210-27. 
Listing 
This section does not, in itself require listing or labeling. It does, howrvri, 
require considerable evaluation of equipment. Section 110-2 requires that 
equipment be acceptable only if approved. The term "approved" is defined in 
Article 100 as "acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction/* Before issuing 
approval, the authority having jurisdiction may require evidence of compliance 
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ICLE 426 FIXED OUTDOOR ELECTRIC DE-ICING 
AND SNOW-MELTING EQUIPMENT 
Contents 
General 
5-1. Scope. 
(a) Embedded. 
(b) Exposed. 
6-2. Definitions. 
6-3. Application of Other Articles. 
6-4. Branch-Circuit Sizing. 
Installation 
-10. General. 
-11. Use. 
-12. Thermal Protection. 
r l 3 . Identification. 
>-l4. Special Permission. 
(b) 
426-24. 
(a) 
(b) 
426-25. 
426-26. 
426-27. 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
D. Imp* 
426-30. 
426-31. 
Resistance Heating Elements 
>-20. Embedded De-Icing and Snow-
Melting Equipment. 
(a) Watt Density. 
(b) Spacing. 
(c) Cover. 
(d) Secured. 
(e) Expansion and Contraction. 
6-21. Exposed De-Icing and Snow-
Melting Equipment. 
Secured. 
Overtemperature. 
Expansion and Contraction. 
Flexural Capability. 
Installation of Nonheating 
Leads for Embedded Equip-
ment. 
Grounding Sheath or Braid. 
Raceways. 
Bushings. 
Expansion and Contraction. 
Leads injunction Boxes. 
Installation of Nonheating 
Leads for Exposed Equipment. 
(a) Nonheating Leads. 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
6-22. 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
>6-23. 
Protection. 
Electrical Connection. 
Heating Element Connections. 
Circuit Connections. 
Marking. 
Corrosion Protection. 
Grounding. 
Metal Parts. 
Grounding Braid or Sheath. 
Bonding and Grounding. 
I pedance Heating 
Personnel Protection. 
Voltage Limitations. 
426-32. Isolation Transformer. 
426-33. Induced Currents. 
426-34. Grounding. 
E. Skin Effect Heating 
426-40. Conductor Ampacity. 
426-41. Pull Boxes. 
426-42. Single Conductor in Enclosure 
426-43. Corrosion Protection. 
426-44. Grounding. 
F. Control and Protection 
426-50. Disconnecting Means. 
(a) Disconnection. 
Cord- and Plug-Connected 
Equipment. 
Controllers. 
Temperature Controller with 
"Off" Position. 
(b) Temperature Controller with 
out "Off" Position. 
(c) Remote Temperature Control 
ler. 
(d) Combined Switching Devico 
426-52. Overcurrent Protection. 
(b) 
426-51. 
(a) 
A. General 
- 1 . Scope. The requirements of this article shall apply to electrically energized hr-noty 
?ms and the installation of these systems. 
i) Embedded. Embedded in driveways, walks, steps, and other areas. 
t)) Exposed. Exposed on drainage systems, bridge structures, roofs, and other struct wo 
FIXED OUTDOOR ELECTRIC DE-ICING EQUIPMENT—ARTICLE 426 
Article 426 includes requirements for resistance heating elements, impedance 
heating systems, or skin effect heating systems. These systems are defined in 
Section 426-2. In addition, specific requirements are provided for exposed 
resistance heating elements of the type commonly used on residences for gutter 
and roof de-icing and snow melting. See Sections 426-21 and 426-23. See 
commentary following Section 426-11. 
426-2. Definitions. For the purpose of this article: 
Heating System. A complete system consisting of components such as heating elements, 
fastening devices, nonheating circuit wiring, leads, temperature controllers, safety signs, junction 
boxes, raceways, and fittings. 
Resistance Heating Element. A specific separate element to generate heat which is 
embedded in or fastened to the surface to be heated. 
(FPN): Tubular heaters, strip heaters, heating cable, heating tape, and heating panels are examples of 
resistance heaters. 
Impedance Heating System. A system in which heat is generated in a pipe or rod, or 
combination of pipes and rods, by causing current to flow through the pipe or rod by direct 
connection to an ac voltage source from a dual-winding transformer. The pipe or rod shall be 
permitted to be embedded in the surface to be heated, or constitute the exposed components to be 
heated. 
Skin Effect Heating System. A system in which heat is generated on the inner surface of a 
ferromagnetic envelope embedded in or fastened to the surface to be heated. 
(FPN): Typically, an electrically insulated conductor is routed through and connected to the envelope at the 
other end. The envelope and the electrically insulated conductor are connected to an ac voltage source from a 
dual-winding transformer. 
426-3. Application of Other Articles. All requirements of this Code shall apply except as 
specifically amended in this article. Cord- and plug-connected fixed outdoor electric de-icing and 
snow-melting equipment intended for specific use and identified as suitable for this use shall be 
installed according to Article 422. Fixed outdoor electric de-icing and snow-melting equipment for 
use in hazardous (classified) locations shall comply with Articles 500 through 516. 
See Sections 422-6 and 422-8. 
426-4. Branch-Circuit Sizing. The ampacity of branch-circuit conductors and the rating or 
setting of overcurrent protective devices supplying fixed outdoor electric de-icing and 
snow-melting equipment shall not be less than 125 percent of the total load of the heaters. The 
rating or setting of overcurrent protective devices shall be permitted in accordance with Section 
240-3, Exception No. 4. 
B. Installation 
426-10. General. Equipment for outdoor electric de-icing and snow melting shall be identified 
as being suitable for: 
(1) The chemical, thermal, and physical environment, and 
(2) Installation in accordance with the manufacturer's drawings and instructions. 
426-11. Use. Electrical heating equipment shall be installed in such a manner as to be afforded 
protection from physical damage. 
The instructions required by UL for UL-listed mat or cable de-icing and 
snow-melting equipment intended for burial in concrete specifically indicate thai 
the slab is required to be a double pour (poured in two parts) if that is the only 
acceptable means of installation. If such a limitation is not specifically mentioned, 
either a single or double pour may be used. See Section 110-3(b). 
